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Constructing the Independence of International 
Investment Arbitrators: Past, Present and Future 
Georgios Dimitropoulos* 
Abstract: Disqualification challenges against international investment arbitra-
tors are increasing. This poses a great challenge for the legitimacy of the inter-
national investment regime. The aim of the Article is to trace the source of this 
development and to propose ways for the future structuring of an international 
investment regime that is both transparent and effective. Legal literature under-
stands arbitrator independence as a standard imposed by legal rules. This does 
not capture the reality of international investment arbitration, especially in the 
framework of the ICSID Convention, which seems to set a lower standard of in-
dependence for ICSID arbitrators. 
This Article presents the latest trends in the challenge process based on an em-
pirical study of the most recent ICSID tribunal decisions. The thesis of the Arti-
cle is that arbitral independence in international investment arbitration is the 
result of a “process of communication” among different actors and prompted by 
the arbitration community itself. Arbitral independence is only partially a result 
of legal rules. It is also a consequence of the creation of a tightly connected 
community of international arbitrators that has been established over the years 
of arbitral practice and which has transposed their ethos and professional prac-
tices onto investment arbitration. This community has constructed a very high 
standard of independence for international investment arbitration, which is now 
set in motion by other actors involved in the field. The Article proposes finally 
the introduction of a new system of control in international investment arbitra-
tion that can address the peculiarities of the constructed process of the creation 
of investor-state arbitration: certification. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial independence is usually understood as a functional concept 
serving either the establishment of the rule of law and due process,1 or the 
work of judges.2 This understanding reflects a predominantly domestic con-
text where institutions are more established and legal concepts more de-
fined than in international law. In the uncertain, complex, and fragmented 
international legal order,3 with a far smaller historical record, institutions 
and concepts cannot be taken for granted; their existence and meaning is 
very often constructed by the actors involved in the field. Independence of 
international adjudicators is a perfect example of the constructed develop-
ment of international law. Given the judicialization of international invest-
ment arbitration,4 there is increasing attention to the need for independence 
of international investment arbitrators.5 The cases in which concerns have 
 
 1  Anja Seibert-Fohr, Judicial Independence – The Normativity of an Evolving Transnational Prin-
ciple, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 1279, 1353–56 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012). 
 2  Yuval Shany, Judicial Independence as an Indicator of International Court Effectiveness: A Goal-
Based Approach, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND 
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 251 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012). 
 3  W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 87–94 (2012). 
 4  See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 L. & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 47, 59–67 (2010). 
 5  See, e.g., Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration: Lessons from International 
Commercial Arbitration, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 445 (Chester 
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) [hereinafter Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration]; 
Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality and Duty of Disclosure in Investment 
Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 153 
(Christina Knahr et al. eds., 2010); Gabriel Bottini, Should Arbitrators Live On Mars? Challenge Of 
Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 341 (2009); Federica Cristani, 
Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Investment Arbitration: An Overview, 13 
L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 153 (2014); Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., Arbitrator 
Independence and Impartiality: Examining the Dual Role of Arbitrator and Counsel, IV Annual Forum 
for Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers, New Delhi, 27–29, Oct. 2010 
(IISD, 2011); James Crawford, Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitrations, Confronting Global 
Challenges: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Investor-State Arbitration, PCSA Peace Palace Centenary 
Seminar (Oct. 11, 2013). 
Many commentators treat the issue of independence in international commercial and investment arbitra-
tion in the same context. See, e.g., H.E. Markus Buechel, The Independence of International Arbitrators, 
in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL 
CHALLENGES 243 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012); Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic 
Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 3 J. 
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been raised, and challenges against arbitrators have been filed, are increas-
ing.6 Arbitrator practice also views the field as increasingly judicialized 
with a need for more independence.7 
Over the last years, international legal documents, scholars, and practi-
tioners involved in investment law have developed a standard of independ-
ence of international investment arbitrators similar to that which applies to 
domestic and international judges. A natural consequence of this develop-
ment is the increasing rate of challenges against arbitrators in the different 
arbitral fora. As of June 30, 2014, the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes8 had registered 473 cases under the ICSID Convention 
and Additional Facility Rules.9 Out of these cases, 68 arbitrators were sub-
 
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2013); K. V. S. K. Nathan, The Independence of Arbitrators, 68 AMICUS 
CURIAE 18, 22 (2006); William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 629, 635 (2009); JONATHAN COTTON, SLAUGHTER AND MAY, HOW TO CHALLENGE AN 
ARBITRATOR’S INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 1 (May 2008), 
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1428119/how_to_challenge_an_arbitrators_independence_an
d_impartiality_may_2008.pdf. The same questions also arise in the field of international commercial 
arbitration. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Behavioral Analysis of Arbitral Decision Making, in 
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 319 
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Drahozal, Arbitral Decision 
Making]; SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE 
NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGERS’ TEST (2009) [hereinafter LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]; Leon E. Trakman, The Impartiality and Independence of 
International Arbitrators Reconsidered, 10 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 999 (2007); Felipe Mutis Tellez, Arbi-
trators’ Independence and Impartiality: A Review Of SCC Board Decisions on Challenges to Arbitra-
tors (2010-2012) (unpublished, on file with the author); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral 
Analysis of Private Judging, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, Private Judg-
ing]; Baiju S. Vasani & Shaun A. Palmer, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators at ICSID: A 
New Dawn?, 30 ICSID REV. 194 (2014) and CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND 
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015) were published 
when the present Article was in the final editing process and have not been considered. 
 6  Undeniably, “there has been a recent uptick in challenges to arbitrators.” Charles B. Rosenberg, 
Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 505, 506 (2010). 
 7  See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the Award 
Rendered on 20 August 2007, ¶ 231 (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ 
VivendiSecondAnnulmentDecision.pdf (“It may have been possible at first to consider Professor Kauf-
mann-Kohler’s attitude in these matters as a one-off serious lapse of judgment but her removal by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Yukos cases after her refusal voluntarily to withdraw appears to 
confirm that she has more broadly a view of her independence and of the relevant criteria in this connec-
tion which do not or do no longer accord with the minimum standards that now prevail in these mat-
ters”). 
 8  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Con-
vention]; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES (Apr. 10, 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES]. 
 9  See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS (ISSUE 2014-2) 7 (2014), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202014-
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ject to a challenge procedure.10 Most proposals for arbitrator disqualifica-
tion in ICSID have been brought forward only in the last few years. The 
empirical study of the most recent ICSID tribunal disqualification awards 
reveals some changes in the disqualification standard of review of arbitral 
independence, the challenge process, and the final decisions of the deciding 
authorities.11 The aim of this Article is to trace the source of this develop-
ment and to propose ways for the future structuring of an international in-
vestment regime that is both transparent and effective. 
In the volatile and uncertain world of international law,12 international 
courts have had difficulties adapting. The flexibility of international arbitra-
tion is one reason why international investment arbitration has been so suc-
cessful in recent years and especially since the late 1990s.13 International 
investment tribunals operate as functional equivalents to courts in interna-
tional law. For this reason, and under the guidance of the arbitration com-
munity, investor-state tribunals had to operate under similar independence 
standards in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community. 
The thesis of the Article is that the quest for arbitral independence is 
the result of a “process of communication”14 and interaction between the 
members of the international arbitration community, states, international 
organizations, arbitration houses, and international courts prompted by the 
arbitration community.15 Arbitral independence is only partially a result of 
 
2%20(English).pdf. 
 10  The present study builds on KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 455–61 (2012). The relevant information is obtained 
primarily from Newly Posted Awards, Decisions & Materials, ITALAW, http://www.italaw.com/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 11  It is unfortunately difficult to collect similar data on investment cases in other fora like the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration and the International Chamber of Commerce. The Article will also not be 
dealing with the related and very interesting latest occurrence of the exclusion of counsel. See Hrvatska 
Elektroprivreda v. Slovenia, Tribunal’s Ruling Regarding the Participation of David Mildon QC in Fur-
ther Stages of the Proceedings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (May 6, 2008), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC950_En&caseId=C69; 
Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision of the Tribunal on the Partici-
pation of a Counsel (Jan. 14, 2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1370_En&caseId=C72. 
 12  REISMAN, supra note 3. 
 13  See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3 (Apr. 10, 2013); ICSID, supra note 9. 
 14  See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 101 (1981). 
 15  See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) 
[hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE] (on the role of the arbitration community in the 
construction of international arbitration). A similar influence of lawyers in the construction of interna-
tional legal fields has been observed also in other areas. The relevant literature is rapidly growing; see 
generally 
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legal rules. A comparison between adjudication fora shows that there are 
great similarities and great differences between the independence guaran-
tees of international judges and those of international arbitrators. Both types 
of adjudicators share three common standards of personal independence: (a) 
qualifications of the adjudicators; (b) rules on disclosure (and investiga-
tion), primarily concerning possible conflicts of interest; and (c) challenge 
rules. However, standards of organizational independence such as safe-
guards regarding tenure and salaries are not shared and apply only to judg-
es. Arbitral independence is rather the effect of the creation of a tightly 
connected community of international arbitrators that has been established 
over the years of arbitral practice.16 It is largely the same community of 
people that deals with international investment cases in the international in-
vestment fora. They have transposed their ethos and professional practices 
onto the investment law regime and arbitration. 
The international arbitration community applies the higher “appear-
ance of bias” standard of international courts to the evaluation of arbitral 
independence. The standard is also usually applied in the ICSID frame-
work, despite Articles 14 and 57 of the ICSID Convention seemingly set-
ting a different standard of independence, namely “manifest lack of inde-
pendent judgment.” This is substantially lower than the appearance of bias 
 
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth 
eds., 2012); LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves Dezalay & Bryant 
G. Garth eds., 2011); THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
(Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011); see also ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF 
EMPIRE (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2010) (on the role of lawyers in institutional reform in 
Asia); A HISTORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF 
LAW IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Gabrielle Z. Marceau ed., 2015) (on the role of lawyers 
in the World Trade Organization); THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, 
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. 
Garth eds., 2002) (concerning the role of lawyers in institution-building in Latin America); LAW AND 
THE FORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Mi-
kael Rask Madsen & Chris Thornhill eds., 2014) (on the role of lawyers in the transformation of Eu-
rope); LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD (Antoine Vauchez & 
Bruno de Witte eds., 2013); Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise 
and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 (2006) (on the 
role of lawyers in the construction of the field of human rights); John Hagan, Ron Levi & Gabrielle Fer-
rales, Swaying the Hand of Justice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime Change at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 585 (2006) (on the role of 
lawyers in the construction of international criminal law); cf. also Mikael Rask Madsen, Sociological 
Approaches to International Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
388, 392 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) (on similar transformations in 
the field of European human rights); ANTOINE VAUCHEZ & LAURENT WILLEMEZ, LA LUSTICE FACE À 
SES RÉFORMATEURS (1980–2006): ENTREPRISES DE MODERNISATION ET LOGIQUES DE RÉSISTANCES 
(2007) (concerning the role of lawyers in the reform of the French judicial system); Mikael Rask Mad-
sen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of Human Rights at 
the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007). 
 16  See DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTURE, supra note 15, passim. 
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standard that applies in international courts and other fora of international 
arbitration. Still, the arbitration community usually adheres to an interpreta-
tion beyond the grammar of Articles 14 and 57 in its willingness to be and 
appear to be independent to the outside world. The ultimate manifestation 
of the willingness of the arbitration community to be and appear independ-
ent is the International Bar Association’s “Guidelines on Conflicts of Inter-
est in International Arbitration,”17 which are practically identical on the is-
sues of the independence standard and the functional independence and 
impartiality to the statutes of international courts and “The Burgh House 
Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary.”18 
In ICSID, a modified appearance of bias standard as reflected in the 
recent case law of ICSID tribunals is applicable. The Article proposes, 
though, the application of the non-modified appearance of bias standard for 
the chairperson of the tribunal. The differences between the two standards 
are the burden of proof of the challenging party and the disqualification 
standard of review of the deciding authority. The challenging party has to 
pass a higher bar in order to prove dependence or partiality of the party-
appointed arbitrator in comparison to the chairperson of the tribunal; the 
deciding authority—either the unchallenged arbitrators, or the Chairperson 
of the Administrative Council of ICSID—should apply good faith review in 
the case of the party-appointed arbitrators in comparison to full substantive 
review in the case of the chairperson. 
Given current dissatisfaction among some participants and observers 
with both the overall structure of the investor-State arbitration and the re-
sults it produces,19 several proposals have been put forward as alternatives 
to the current system.20 This Article argues an arbitrator certification system 
is the best solution. 
This Article’s analysis of the construction of arbitral independence re-
veals that the best way to improve the overall investor-state arbitration sys-
 
 17  INT’L BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(2004), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=21D27F55-134B-4791-A01C-
F8B6658BAB24 [hereinafter IBA GUIDELINES]. 
 18  Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International 
Courts and Tribunals, in association with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (adopted 
June 2004), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/burgh_final_21204.pdf [hereinafter Burgh House Prin-
ciples]. 
 19  See generally Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Inves-
tor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014). 
 20  See, e.g., UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (June 13, 2013) (discussing five main reform paths, namely 
promoting ADR, tailoring the existing system through individual international investment agreements, 
limiting investor access to ISDS, introducing an appeals facility and creating a standing international 
investment court); see generally THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, 
REALITIES, OPTIONS (Jose E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011). 
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tem is by focusing on the arbitration community, the arbitrators and their 
qualities, rather than on any major institutional reform. A solution cannot 
include fundamental changes to the legal and institutional framework if it is 
to be at all viable and accepted by all players in the field. The proposal put 
forward in this Article is to regulate investor-state arbitration in a complete-
ly different way than the alternatives proposed so far, by introducing a new 
system of control21 in international investment arbitration that can address 
the peculiarities of investor-state arbitration: arbitrator certification.22 The 
proposed certification system shifts the focus from the institutions to the ar-
bitration community and the person of the arbitrator,23 and certification be-
comes extremely relevant in view of the discussions on the adoption of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
Part II of the Article introduces the issues of arbitral independence. 
First, it presents a recent case from a non-investment law forum, an Article 
VII United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea Tribunal. The deci-
sion in the disqualification challenge between Mauritius v. U.K. is im-
portant to the independence of international arbitrators since it deals with 
several open issues and involves many of the specialists in the field, either 
as arbitrators, counsel, or experts.24 Caratube v. Kazakhstan, one of the lat-
est decisions on a disqualification challenge from an ICSID tribunal, is a 
major step towards further crystallization of the rapidly evolving ICSID 
case law.25 The remainder of Part II compares the independence standards 
applicable in the various international courts. Independence guarantees in 
the statutes of the four courts with universal jurisdiction have been identi-
fied: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Court, and the 
 
 21  See generally MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR (1992); W. Michael Reisman, Reflections on the Control 
Mechanism of the ICSID System, 6 REV. INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 197 (2010); W. Michael Reisman, 
The Breakdown Of The Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739 (1989). 
 22  See also Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to 
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN J. INT’L L. 53, 62 n.53, 121 & n.383 (2005) (“Finally, as 
some have already suggested for the domestic context, perhaps the time has come for licensing or certi-
fication procedures to regulate arbitrator conduct. These steps are inevitable as the pool of international 
arbitrators transforms from being an ad hoc collection of highly talented independent contractors into a 
fully formed profession.”). 
 23  See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 82–106 (developing a functional approach to the regulation of 
arbitrators).  
 24  See Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, Reasoned 
Decision on Challenge, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), http://pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1782.  
 25  Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch (Mar. 20, 
2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf. 
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World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB). The Article then 
discusses independence standards in the rules of the most important arbitra-
tion houses like the International Chamber of Commerce and the London 
Court of International Arbitration, and turns quickly to issues that are more 
relevant to international investment arbitration, especially the discussion of 
the independence guarantees of ICSID tribunals where most investment 
cases are adjudicated. 
The nature of independence among international investment arbitrators 
entails only part of the guarantees of independence that international judges 
enjoy. Still, international investment arbitrators are considered to be inde-
pendent and strive to give an appearance of non-biased decisionmaking to-
wards governments and investors. Part III traces the reasons for this devel-
opment in international investment law. First, the international arbitration 
community has transposed its ethos onto the international investment re-
gime; second, the functional equivalence of arbitration and judicial settle-
ment in international dispute resolution has brought about common stand-
ards. 
Part IV discusses five reform proposals that have been put forward for 
an institutional re-shaping of international investment arbitration, namely: 
abolishing party-appointed arbitrators; introducing an appeal mechanism or 
standing international investment court; adopting Codes of Conduct; or re-
turning to a combination of diplomacy and domestic courts. The Article ex-
plains why these proposals are not viable solutions for the reform of inter-
national investment arbitration. The Article then proposes introducing a 
new system of control in international investment arbitration, which has 
been tested in the field of mediation: certification. Based on a functional 
understanding of the field of international investment arbitration,26 the re-
form proposal focuses less on institutions and more on the attributes of the 
arbitration community. After all, it is arbitrators who have the most influ-
ence on the quality of the arbitration system.27 
 II. INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORS 
According to several accounts, the field of international investment ar-
 
 26  See Rogers, supra note 22, at 109 (footnotes omitted) (“This sketch of the universal core features 
of international arbitrators provides a basis for a definition of the arbitrator’s functional role, from which 
it is possible to outline broadly the structure of arbitrator ethics.”). According to the functional approach, 
ethical obligations cannot simply be transplanted from other professions, but must instead be derived 
from the nature of the decisionmaker’s role. See also CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 338–39 (2014). 
 27  Cf. Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 421, 424 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (“An independent judge is thus not by definition a good judge; 
although good judges tend to be independent.”). 
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bitration is undergoing a phase of judicialization similar to that observed in 
other international regimes.28 The unfolding concerns regarding arbitral in-
dependence seem to corroborate these accounts.29 Due to judicial globaliza-
tion of the international legal order in general, judicial independence has 
become a pressing issue in international courts and tribunals. There is in-
creasing attention to not only the need for independence of international 
judges generally, but also the need for independent international commer-
cial30 and international investment arbitrators. The number of cases filed 
raising concerns and challenges against arbitrators is increasing, and the ar-
bitral profession confronts a growing need for independence. This Chapter 
discusses two of the most important recent cases for the development of the 
law of independence in international investment arbitration: Mauritius v. 
U.K. and Caratube v. Kazakhstan, which highlight how both the substance 
and process of decisionmaking is critically important. The discussion then 
turns to the development of a global standard of international adjudicator 
independence and compares it with the applicable standard in international 
investment arbitration. This part then discusses the peculiarities of the 
ICSID framework and how it has been interpreted and applied in the most 
recent case law. 
 A. An Increasing Trend in International Arbitration: Two Recent 
Cases 
 1. Mauritius v. U.K. 
This well-reasoned decision on a disqualification proposal by a Tribu-
nal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention for the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has considered all the issues regarding arbitral 
independence in international law.31 The challenge arose out of a law of the 
sea case between the Republic of Mauritius and the U.K. Many of the key 
figures in international dispute settlement were involved in this case.32 This 
 
 28  See Sweet, supra note 4, at 47. Sweet mentions four judicialization indicators that apply to Inves-
tor-State arbitration: the creation of precedent; the adoption of balancing techniques; the admission of 
amicus briefs; and the push for appellate supervision of arbitral awards. These are substantive indicators 
of judicialization that prove the existence of at least the arbitrators’ judge-like function in view of the 
new and evolving governance field of Investor-State arbitration. 
 29  Gus Van Harten, for example, criticizes the lack of independence of Investor-State arbitrators and 
the delegation of the judicial function of the states to arbitration panels. See GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 172 (2007).  
 30  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5, particularly Drahozal, Private Juding, at 105, and Drahozal, 
Arbitral Decision Making, at 319. 
 31  See Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, Reasoned 
Decision on Challenge, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), http://pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1782. 
 32  They include: Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, a German national, as arbitrator appointed by Mauritius; 
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elevated the case to a battle about the applicable independence standard for 
adjudicators in international law, making the case relevant for the invest-
ment arbitration framework as well. 
Mauritius challenged Judge Greenwood, the arbitrator appointed by 
the UK, and this challenge was decided by the remaining arbitrators. The 
challenge was based on four grounds:33 
(i) [Judge Greenwood’s] involvement with the United Kingdom on 
legal matters touching directly or indirectly on [the object of the dis-
pute]; 
(ii) his involvement with the United Kingdom on the application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) to the 
Chagos Archipelago or to the British overseas territories; 
(iii) his intention to seek reelection to the International Court of Jus-
tice (the “ICJ”); and 
(iv) his service on the Appointments Board for the new Legal Advis-
er to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
The Republic of Mauritius favored a contextual interpretation of the 
relevant articles of the Convention that refer to the independence of interna-
tional arbitrators, whereas it presented a very broad understanding of con-
text with reference to the provisions of other international arbitration rules 
and treaties and also to domestic case law. Article 2(1) UNCLOS Annex 
VII reads: 
A list of arbitrators shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations. Every State Party shall be enti-
tled to nominate four arbitrators, each of whom shall be a person ex-
perienced in maritime affairs and enjoying the highest reputation for 
fairness, competence and integrity. The names of the persons so 
 
Judge Sir Christopher Greenwood CMG QC, a British national, as arbitrator appointed by the U.K.; 
Judge James Kateka, a Tanzanian national, and Judge Albert Hoffmann, a South African national, as 
arbitrators; and Professor Ivan Shearer, an Australian national, as arbitrator and President of the Tribu-
nal, appointed by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) pursuant to 
Article 3(e) of Annex VII of UNCLOS. Mauritius was represented, among others, by Professor James 
Crawford SC, an Australian national and Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, 
who is currently a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Professor Philippe Sands QC, a British 
national and Professor of International Law at University College London. Judge Thomas Mensah, and 
Professors George Bermann, Kate Malleson and Yuval Shany also submitted opinions supporting the 
positions of Mauritius. It is interesting to note that Crawford, Sands, Mensah, Shany and Malleson are 
members of the International Law Association Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals which elaborated the “Burgh House Principles,” see supra note 18, at 1 
(“Noting in particular that each court or tribunal has its own characteristics and functions and that in 
certain instances judges serve on a part-time basis or as ad hoc or ad litem judges.”). Judge Gilbert Guil-
laume, and former Judge and President of the ICJ and predecessor of Judge Greenwood in the ICJ, 
Dame Rosalyn Higgins submitted Statements in favor of the position of the U.K. 
 33  Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 10. 
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nominated shall constitute the list.34 
The U.K. took a more textual approach. Moreover, its understanding 
of context was only with reference to the ICJ and ITLOS, which are the 
other fora that can adjudicate UNCLOS disputes. ICJ, UNCLOS and Annex 
VII provisions have the common unifying factor that they apply to inter-
State disputes. 
Additionally, both the U.K. and Judge Greenwood made the case 
about the difference between inter-State and non-inter-State arbitration, 
considering that—independent of what applies to the latter—a different 
standard applies to the former. Namely, the applicable standard is not the 
role/issue conflict standard of international commercial and Investor-State 
arbitration but rather the lower “specific prior involvement standard,” which 
calls for previous involvement in the specific case. This is the standard that 
the ICJ applies in disqualification applications before it.35 
According to Mauritius, the appearance of bias test was satisfied by 
the “extremely close and longstanding relationship between Judge Green-
wood and the United Kingdom.”36 According to the U.K., Judge Green-
wood had had no prior involvement in the subject matter of the specific 
case and thus the challenge should fail.37 The Tribunal, in agreement with 
the U.K. and Judge Greenwood, held that principles and rules developed in 
the context of international commercial and investment arbitration were not 
applicable to inter-State disputes, such as the dispute in question.38 “The 
Tribunal . . . decided that the law applicable to [this] arbitration [was] that 
to be found in Annex VII of the Convention . . ., supplemented by the law 
and practice of international courts and tribunals in inter-State cases.”39 
 
 34  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (emphasis added); see also id. annex VII, art. 3(e) (Arbitration), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex7.htm: 
   Unless the parties agree that any appointment under subparagraphs (c) and (d) be made by a 
person or a third State chosen by the parties, the President of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea shall make the necessary appointments. If the President is unable to act 
under this subparagraph or is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the appointment 
shall be made by the next senior member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
who is available and is not a national of one of the parties. The appointments referred to in 
this subparagraph shall be made from the list referred to in article 2 of this Annex within a 
period of 30 days of the receipt of the request and in consultation with the parties. The mem-
bers so appointed shall be of different nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinari-
ly resident in the territory of, or nationals of, any of the parties to the dispute. 
 35  See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 2, 3 (2004); see also id. at 7 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting).  
 36  Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 72. 
 37  Id. ¶ 84 
 38  Id. ¶¶ 165–168. 
 39  Id. ¶ 165; see also the Notes to the PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, OPTIONAL RULES FOR 
ARBITRATING DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO STATES, which make clear that the PCA rules include modifica-
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Moreover, the Tribunal specifically rejected applying the International Bar 
Association Guidelines, which have gained great importance in recent 
years. 
Based on this reasoning, the Tribunal concluded that a party challeng-
ing an arbitrator must demonstrate that under the standards applicable to in-
ter-State cases there are justifiable grounds for doubting the independence 
and impartiality of that arbitrator in a particular case.40 The reason for this is 
that the “system of inter-[S]tate dispute settlement” is based on the consent 
of the parties and, more specifically, upon the rules of public international 
law as laid out in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.41 The Tribunal further 
said that since it was undisputed that Judge Greenwood was not involved in 
the dispute before he was appointed as arbitrator, Article 8(1) of the ITLOS 
Statute could not serve as a ground for challenge.42 Regarding the further 
claim concerning Judge Greenwood’s participation on the Board for the Se-
lection of the U.K.’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office Legal Adviser, the 
Tribunal said it had scrutinized his participation in that process with special 
care since it occurred “simultaneously” with Judge Greenwood’s participa-
tion as an arbitrator in the case.43 Despite this scrutiny, the relationship be-
tween Judge Greenwood and the U.K. Government was not found to be 
“continuing,” and as a result Mauritius’s challenge against Judge Green-
wood was dismissed. 
This result is extremely important both because of the subject matters 
of the dispute and the persons involved. It is expected that the decision will 
have a major impact on future arbitrator disqualification motions. The first 
key finding of the Tribunal was that the proper inquiry concerning arbitral 
independence is not whether actual bias or dependence upon a party exists 
but instead whether there is an appearance of bias or lack of independence 
or impartiality. The Tribunal’s second move, to differentiate between inter-
State and private-private disputes, was less expected. One would have ex-
pected the Tribunal to apply higher standards of judicial independence in 
inter-State cases, but the Tribunal took a restrictive approach to the so-
called “issue-conflict question,” partly following the approach of the ICJ 
statute and precedent. With this decision, the Tribunal has placed a great 
trust on the power of the states to shape their contractual relationships with 
other states. 
 
tions, inter alia, “to reflect the public international law character of disputes between States, and diplo-
matic practice appropriate to such disputes,” which reflects the Rules’ origins in the UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Rules. 
 40  Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 166. 
 41  Id. ¶ 167. 
 42  Id. ¶ 172. 
 43  Id. ¶ 181. 
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 2. Caratube v. Kazakhstan 
Before going into an analysis of the standards of arbitral independ-
ence, it is worth looking at one of the most recent decisions on arbitrator 
disqualification in the international investment law context. This decision 
epitomizes the state of the art concerning the standard of arbitral independ-
ence. Caratube gives the arbitral community’s stamp of approval to recent 
doctrinal shifts driven by an interplay between the Chairman of the Admin-
istrative Council of ICSID and arbitrators sitting on various tribunals. 
The challenge arose out of a dispute between Caratube International 
Oil Company LLP, a Kazakh company, and Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani, a 
U.S. national, on the claimant side, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, on the 
other.44 The claimants raised their concerns in relation to Bruno Boesch, the 
arbitrator of the respondent, who had been repeatedly appointed to serve as 
co-arbitrator by the counsel for the respondent (the law firm Curtis, Mallet-
Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP), including in an UNCITRAL arbitration in-
volving Kazakhstan, Ruby Roz Agricol v. The Republic of Kazakhstan.  Pur-
suant to Article 58 of the ICSID Convention and Article 9(4) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, the unchallenged arbitrators, Laurent Lévy and Laurent 
Aynès, had to decide on the disqualification. 
First, the Tribunal laid out the substantive standard of review. Alt-
hough not stated in Articles 57 and 14 of the ICSID Convention, it is gener-
ally accepted that arbitrators have to be not only independent but also im-
partial.45 Concerning the applicable legal standard, the Tribunal explained 
this is “an ‘objective standard based on a reasonable evaluation of the evi-
dence by a third party’ or, in other words, on the ‘point of view of a reason-
able and informed third person’”.46 It then clarified the meaning of the word 
“manifest” in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention by stating that it “means 
‘evident’ or ‘obvious’ in that it ‘relates to the ease with which the alleged 
 
 44  Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 45  Id. ¶ 52,which cites to some of the most recently decided cases, namely: Abaclat & Others v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of 
the Tribunal, ¶ 74 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3057.pdf; Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Deci-
sion on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶ 65 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf; Repsol S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña and Claus von Wobeser, ¶ 70 (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3033.pdf; Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of the 
Tribunal, ¶ 58 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3009.pdf. 
 46  Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, ¶ 54 (quoting Blue Bank International 
& Trust (Barbados) Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, ¶ 60). 
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lack of [independence or impartiality] can be perceived.’”47 The Tribunal 
explained that the lack of independence and impartiality is “evident” or 
“obvious,” and therefore “manifest,” if it can be “discerned with little effort 
and without deeper analysis.”48 
As to the burden of proof, the parties even further divided and the Tri-
bunal offered more precise reasoning.49 The claimants argued that the arbi-
trators must be disqualified if it is shown that there are “reasonable doubts” 
as to their independence or impartiality. The respondent submitted that the 
existence of reasonable doubts is not enough, and instead, the claimants 
must submit clear evidence of the arbitrators’ lack of impartiality and inde-
pendence. The Caratube Tribunal, composed of the unchallenged arbitra-
tors, followed recent case law on this point as shaped by the Chairman of 
the ICSID Administrative Council, Kim Yong Kim. The first relevant 
ICSID case was Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela, which was followed as precedent by Burling-
ton Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Repsol S.A. & Repsol Butano 
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, & Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic. 
In these cases, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council found 
that “Articles 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not require proof of 
actual dependence or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish the appearance 
of dependence or bias.”50 
The Caratube Tribunal crystallizes the emerging new standard for ar-
bitrator disqualification, but it does more, too. For the first time in investor-
State arbitration history, the unchallenged arbitrators, after discussing dif-
ferent claims made by the claimants, found that the claimants had demon-
strated that a third party would have found that there was an evident or ob-
vious appearance of a lack of impartiality or independence based on a 
reasonable evaluation of the facts and that, therefore, Mr. Boesch manifest-
ly lacked one of the qualities required by Article 14(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention in this particular case and thus had to be disqualified. 
 B. A Global Standard of International Adjudicator’s Independence? 
Independence is a defining feature of every dispute resolution system. 
In the sections to follow, we will trace the variable of adjudicator independ-
 
 47  Id. ¶ 55 (quoting Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, 
¶ 61). 
 48  Id. (quoting EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Chal-
lenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ¶ 68 (June 25, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0262.pdf). 
 49  Id. ¶¶ 56–57. 
 50  Id. ¶ 57; Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, ¶ 59; 
Burlington Resources, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, ¶ 66; Repsol S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
¶ 71; Abaclat & Others, ARB/07/5, ¶ 76. 
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ence in legal texts, decisions, and studies of domestic and primarily interna-
tional courts and tribunals. The standards which make up the judicial func-
tion vis-à-vis independence and impartiality are basically the same for na-
tional and international tribunals.51 Moreover, all international courts and 
tribunals use a fairly similar legal standard of independence, including the 
elements of independence, impartiality, and avoidance of the appearance of 
bias.52 Comparisons between these standards will help us forge the neces-
sary links between international investment arbitration and other interna-
tional adjudication fora.53 
 1. Independence Guarantees of Domestic and International Judges 
What does it mean to be an independent judge in the domestic setting? 
According to a short meta-analysis conducted by the World Bank, a truly 
independent judiciary has three characteristics:54 (a) it is independent in the 
strict sense, meaning that there is no interference from the parties to the rel-
evant disputes or other branches of government; (b) it is impartial, meaning 
that its decisions are not influenced by the personal interest of the judge in 
the outcome of the case; and (c) its decisions are enforced, meaning that a 
court’s decision should be implemented, either in a voluntary or coerced 
manner. 
Empirical research in the field identifies similar characteristics of judi-
cial independence. The comparative empirical work of Feld and Voigt, for 
example, identifies variables of judicial independence and distinguishes and 
measures de jure and de facto judicial independence.55 The study is based 
on a questionnaire that has been sent to academics and practitioners in 
countries all over the world. Their variables of de jure judicial independ-
ence are: (a) whether the highest courts are anchored in the constitution; (b) 
how difficult is it to amend the constitution; (c) appointment procedures of 
judges; (d) the length of tenure of judges; (e) whether there is a fixed re-
 
 51  Karin Oellers-Frahm, International Courts and Tribunals, Judges and Arbitrators, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2013), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e45. 
 52  Id. ¶¶ 8, 30. According to Oellers-Frahm, these principles may even be considered as customary 
international law. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30. The standards of all international courts and tribunals including the 
ICSID provisions are largely based on the example of the Permanent Court of International Justice and 
the ICJ. Id. ¶ 7. 
 53  According to Rogers, using the judicial standard as a referent for the definition of arbitrator inde-
pendence and impartiality is misleading. Rogers, supra note 22, at 67–71, 81. 
 54  MATTHEW STEPHENSON, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT CAN BE MEASURED, 
WHY IT OCCURS 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/ 
JudicialIndependence.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2016); cf. also, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and 
G.A. Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
 55  Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evi-
dence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 498 (2003). 
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tirement age of judges in the court; (f) removal procedures; (g) whether re-
election of judges is possible; (h) protection and adequacy of the salary of 
judges; (i) accessibility to the highest court; (j) procedure for the allocation 
of cases in court; (k) judicial review powers; and (l) transparency of the 
court. The variables of de facto judicial independence are: (a) average 
length of tenure; (b) deviation of average length of tenure from de jure pre-
scription; (c) number of judges removed from office; (d) frequency of 
changes in the number of judges in the court; (e) real salary of judges; (f) 
real court’s budget; (g) number of constitutional changes in the relevant ar-
ticles; and (h) compliance by other branches with court rulings. 
Due to the different setting in which they operate, international courts 
sometimes present different questions with regard to the nature of judicial 
independence in comparison to domestic courts.56 At the same time, if in-
ternational courts intend to exert more influence, they must be expected to 
establish a reputation for neutrality and objectivity.57 For this reason, judi-
cial independence guarantees for international judges are largely the same 
as those for domestic judges. Similar provisions are included in the statutes 
of all four international courts with universal jurisdiction that are the subject 
of our study, namely the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal 
Court, and the World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB).58 
Following Feld and Voigt, we can break down the judicial independ-
 
 56  For example, in the international setting, independence may refer primarily to possible influence 
from governments, but also from multinational enterprises and non-governmental organizations. 
 57  Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (2005). 
 58  See generally INDÉPENDANCE ET IMPARTIALITÉ DES JUGES INTERNATIONAUX [INDEPENDENCE 
AND FAIRNESS OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES] (Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Jean-Marc Sorel eds., 2010); L.E. 
Petteti, Independence of International Judges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATE 496 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985); Voeten, supra note 27; DOMINIK 
ZIMMERMANN, THE INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE ADHERENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY TO A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (2014); 
Chester Brown, The Evolution and Application of Rules Concerning Independence of the “International 
Judiciary,” 2 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 63, 65 (2003); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, 
Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2011); 
Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the In-
ternational Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271 (2003); Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impar-
tiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 899 (2005); Yuval Shany & Sigall Horovitz, Judicial Independence in The Hague 
and Freetown: A Tale of Two Cities, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 113 (2008); see also Steve Charnovitz, Judi-
cial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES 219 (Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes et al. eds., 2002) (on judicial independence the WTO); Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of In-
ternational Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 
(2008) (on judicial independence in the European Court of Human Rights). 
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ence guarantees into several subcategories. Qualitative analysis of the dif-
ferent provisions may lead us to a further distinction between two types of 
judicial independence guarantees: they can be divided into functional/
personal guarantees and organizational guarantees. Functional independ-
ence guarantees refer to the function of decisionmaking and are addressed 
to the person of the judge. They include primarily the “qualifications” of 
judges.59 According to Article 2 of the ICJ Statute, for example, “the Court 
shall be composed of a body of independent judges.” Further functional in-
dependence guarantees are, using the terms of Feld and Voigt, “conflict of 
interest rules,”60 “rules on disclosure of conflicts of interest,”61 “challenge” 
or “disqualification” rules,62 and “immunities.”63 
Organizational guarantees refer to organizational safeguards in the 
statutes of the courts dealing with the institutional separation of judges from 
other branches of government, the parties, and in some cases other divisions 
of the same  or another court64 Typical organizational guarantees are, in 
Feld and Voigt terms, “whether the courts are anchored in the international 
treaty,” “how difficult it is to amend the court statute,”65 “appointment pro-
cedures of the judges,”66 “secure judicial tenure with fixed terms,”67 “fixed 
retirement age of the judges in the court,” “existence of process for removal 
 
 59  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 36, 40, 45, opened for signature July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; DSU, Dispute 
Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, Apr. 14, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU]; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea arts. 
2, 11, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 [hereinafter ITLOS Statute]; Statute of 
the International Court of Justice arts. 2, 20, opened for signature June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 60  See ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 16–17; ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 7–8; Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 59, art. 41; World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, annex 
2, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 (adopted Aug. 16, 2010). 
 61  See ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 8(2); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 24; International 
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 33, ICC-ASP/1/3 (1994); World Trade Organi-
zation, supra note 61. 
 62  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 40(4); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 8, 18; ICJ Stat-
ute, supra note 59, arts. 14, 24, 34; World Trade Organization, supra note 61. 
 63  Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 48(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 10 (see also Agree-
ment on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, May 19–23, 
1997, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/25); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 19; World Trade Organization, Rules of 
Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts. II–
III, VI, WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 1996). 
 64  The organizational guarantees could be further divided into “core organizational issues,” “finan-
cial guarantees,” and “compliance provisions.” 
 65  See ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 41; ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 69–70. 
 66  See ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 4; Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36; ITLOS Statute, supra 
note 59, art. 4. 
 67  See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36(9)(a); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 15(1); ICJ 
Statute, supra note 59 art. 13(1). 
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from office,”68 “re-election possibility,”69 “protection and adequacy of the 
salary of the judges,”70 “accessibility to the court,”71 “procedure for alloca-
tion of cases in the court,”72 “judicial review powers,” “transparency of the 
court,”73 and “compliance provisions.”74 
There are no major differences in the functional independence guaran-
tees in the four universal courts, and there are also many common features 
in their organizational guarantees. The ICJ has relatively average organiza-
tional safeguards compared to the other courts, whereas it has the poorest 
compliance provisions. ITLOS, despite having been established in 1996, 
draws heavily on the provisions of the ICJ embodying the previous consen-
sus on what was necessary for independence. The International Criminal 
Court has some of the most up-to-date provisions for judicial independence 
including non-renewable terms to insulate judges from possible political in-
fluence.75 The WTO AB has, compared to the other courts, the lowest safe-
guards in several categories including: “length of tenure,” having only four-
year terms compared to nine-year terms for the other courts; “protection and 
adequacy of salary”; and “publication of decision and dissent,” being the 
only court where dissents are usually not made public.76 In the WTO AB, 
there is also no “process for removal from office,” which might allow for 
some political influence from WTO members if such a question arises.77 
But at the same time, it is also the only court that has a concrete “procedure 
for the allocation of cases,” and includes “the fullest set of guarantees to as-
sure compliance with its decisions.” 
The distinctions will become very helpful in the analysis of arbitral in-
dependence since they can help us understand what parts of the legal safe-
guards are missing and in what ways the arbitration community has man-
aged to strike a balance between the absence of legal rules and the 
 
 68  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 46; ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 7, 9; ICJ Statute, 
supra note 59, art. 18. 
 69  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 35, 36. 
 70  See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 49; DSU, supra note 59, art. 17; ITLOS Statute, supra 
note 59, art. 18(1), (5); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 32(5), (8). 
 71  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 1; DSU, supra note 59, art. 17; ITLOS Statute, supra note 
59, arts. 20, 21; ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 34, 35(1), 36. 
 72  See World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, annex 2, Rules 3, 4, 5, 
WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 (adopted Aug. 16, 2010). 
 73  Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 56, 57, 58; DSU, supra note 59, art. 18; ITLOS Statute, supra 
note 59, arts. 50, 74, 83; Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 17, 18. 
 74  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, pts. 9, 10; DSU, supra note 59, arts. 17, 19, 22; ITLOS, supra 
note 59, art. 33. 
 75  See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36(9)(a). 
 76  See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
895, 905–20 (2006). 
 77  See also TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES 
AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 167 (2004). 
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introduction of its own rules. 
 2. Appearance of Bias and Absolute Limits 
Beyond the features of judicial independence that refer to the institu-
tional design of the courts and tribunals, there are also substantive standards 
of judicial independence. The very well-known dictum of Lord Chief Jus-
tice Hewart that “justice must be done and be seen to be done” is consid-
ered the touchstone substantive standard of judicial independence for do-
mestic judges.78 Supported also by Article 6 European Convention of 
Human Rights case law, the “appearance of bias” test can be considered the 
worldwide standard of judicial independence.79 According to Professors 
Shany and Horovitz, the “reasonable appearance of bias” standard as re-
flected in Principles 9.2 and 12.1 of the non-mandatory Burgh House Prin-
ciples reflects lex lata since it is practiced both in international and domes-
tic courts.80 As we shall see in the following sections, this is also the 
generally applicable standard in international arbitration. 
Next to the appearance of bias test, the principles audi alteram partem 
and nemo iudex in causa sua pose the absolute limits of functional and or-
ganizational independence.81 
 C. Independence in International Investment Arbitration 
After having discussed different aspects of adjudicator independence 
in domestic and international dispute resolution systems, this section focus-
es on the independence guarantees and the applicable standard in invest-
ment arbitration. A study of the relevant documents and case law reveals 
some striking similarities, so that we are able to speak of a common law of 
international arbitration, but also some striking differences between arbi-
tral common law and the ICSID framework, at least on the face of it. This 
discussion is preceded by an outlook on the nature of investor-State arbitra-
tion as reflected in the most recent discussions of international arbitration 
scholars. 
 1. Between Two Worlds 
An important current question in investment law and arbitration con-
 
 78  R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 356, 259. 
 79  See generally Brekoulakis, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
 80  Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 122. As we also saw in the Mauritius v. United Kingdom 
award, it seems that the ICJ Statute in some respects sets the bar to prove the dependence of the judges 
higher than other courts and the Burgh House Principles. Compare, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 
16, 17(2), with Burgh House Principles, supra note 18, arts. 8–11. 
 81  See infra Part III.B. 
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cerns the applicable paradigm.82 The two different paradigms in interna-
tional investment arbitration supposedly clash. Some scholars view inves-
tor-State arbitration as a species of commercial arbitration; others view it as 
a dispute settlement mechanism of (traditional) public (international) law.83 
The question arises because investor-State arbitration is situated between 
two worlds—it departs substantially from traditional public international 
law and from commercial arbitration. 
International investment arbitration has an undoubtedly “public char-
acter.”84 It is usually based on international treaties, which are sources of 
public international law. The parties in a dispute are always a state-
defendant and an investor-claimant. Disputes also have a public character 
since they involve claims by individuals against governments in relation to 
the exercise of public power in disputes that could be considered constitu-
tional or administrative in nature. Moreover, disputes are decided at first 
and last instance. 
On the other side, even treaty-based arbitration has an ad hoc and non-
hierarchical character based on case-specific mandates.85 International in-
vestment tribunals are not international courts.86 They are modeled largely 
on commercial arbitration tribunals, not on court adjudication, and a large 
part of the body of arbitrators comes from commercial arbitration. Addi-
tionally, they have compulsory jurisdiction against states which is a feature 
that many international courts, including the ICJ, do not enjoy. 
Accepting one approach to international investment law and arbitration 
has consequences for the interpretation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
 82  See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Invest-
ment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013). These paradigms do not refer to the question of the 
reasons of the adoption of BITs, including investment arbitration. See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, 
Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 1 (2014) 
(adding the “bounded rational competition model” to the “rational competition,” and the “emulation 
model”). 
 83  See generally Roberts, supra note 82 (with further differentiations); INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 1, 8 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); GUS VAN 
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Stephan Schill, W(h)ither 
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
875 (2011); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006) (on the public law paradigm). 
 84  W. Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ versus ‘Systemic Implications’: How Should 
Investment 
Tribunals Decide? The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 131, 138 (2013). 
 85  Id. at 137. 
 86  International arbitral tribunals do not meet the standards Cesare Romano uses to define interna-
tional courts. According to Romano, international judicial bodies are permanent institutions that are: 
established by an international legal instrument (usually a treaty); rely on international law so as to re-
solve cases; follow set rules of procedure; and issue legally binding judgments. Cesare P. R. Romano, 
The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 709, 713–14 (1999). 
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(BITs), arbitral awards, and also possible proposals for institutional re-
forms.87 Introducing concepts familiar to other more established fields of 
law might help in the development of international investment law and arbi-
tration but could just as easily hinder its development because these con-
cepts are still foreign to this field. For example, one strand of the literature 
supporting the public character of investor-State arbitration argues that the 
traditional public international law approach is not sufficient to describe its 
nature, and proposes understanding investor-State arbitration as a field of 
public law in broader terms including public international law, classical 
public law, and comparative public law.88 This understanding of investor-
State arbitration frequently leads to the interpretation of arbitral review as 
judicial review in domestic courts. But, the concept of public law is accom-
panied by further concepts that may be old-fashioned even for the descrip-
tion of domestic legal orders, like hierarchy, command-and-control, and 
strict separation of powers. This may hinder the adoption of new principles 
and ideas in the field. 
The question of the applicable paradigm in international investment 
law and arbitration spills over into the understanding of the independence of 
investment arbitrators. Stephan Schill, for example, transposes the frame of 
separation of powers as the relevant frame for the independence of arbitra-
tors.89 But, arbitrators don’t operate in the same environment as judges. As 
we shall see, international arbitration, and investor-State arbitration more 
specifically, have their own mechanisms for the promotion of the independ-
ence of the arbitrators. Moreover, even domestic systems have moved away 
from the traditional understanding of an absolute independence of judges 
with the introduction of mechanisms of judicial accountability.90 
As we saw in Mauritius v. U.K., international law might even be sug-
gesting lower independence standards for investor-State arbitration than the 
common law of international arbitration. As further discussed in Caratube 
v. Kazakhstan, international investment arbitration is producing its own un-
derstanding of independence. This Article proposes to take an approach that 
respects the hybrid nature of international investment law and arbitration.91 
International investment tribunals stand in the middle between (internation-
 
 87  See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 46–47; Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International 
Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 223, 229 (2013). 
 88  Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). 
 89  Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard 
of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 580 (2012). 
 90  See, e.g., INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE JUDICIARY passim (Guy Canivet, Mads 
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2006). 
 91  See generally Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, How it Emerged and How it Can be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. 371 (2014). 
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al and domestic) courts and more typical forms of arbitral tribunals.92 The 
suggested approach has an effect on both the proposed standard of inde-
pendence93 and the proposed system of control in international arbitration.94 
 2. Features of the Common Law of Arbitral Independence 
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators is of great importance and 
is commonly found in most arbitration rules and laws.95 A study of the pro-
visions of international arbitration documents, relevant case law and litera-
ture reveals some common features of independence in international arbitra-
tion. In the view of many commentators and arbitral case law, the different 
independence standards employed by investment-related fora, such as the 
ICSID, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Rules, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), are roughly the same despite slight textual 
differences.96 At the same time, the International Bar Associations’ Guide-
lines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines) 
are increasingly considered to be best practice in arbitration97 and reflecting 
the general standard of international arbitrator independence, conflict of in-
terest avoidance, and disclosure. The relevant issues on arbitrator independ-
ence can be broken down into a structured discussion of: (a) independence 
and impartiality; (b) the different types of provisions that constitute the in-
dependence standard; and, eventually, (c) the applicable standard used in 
the assessment of arbitrator independence. 
 
 92  See also Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 660 (2012) 
(saying that investor-State arbitration has both a public and a commercial nature). 
 93  See infra Part II.C.2 and 3. 
 94  See infra Part IV. 
 95  CLYDE CROFT, CHRISTOPHER KEE & JEFF WAINCYMER, A GUIDE TO THE UNICITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES 130 (2013). Croft, Kee and Waincymer even raise arbitral independence to the 
status of an international principle. Id. 
 96  Park, supra note 5, at 670–73. In addition, Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 161, cited to 
several arbitral awards—both commercial and investment—including the following ICSID cases: EDF 
International S.A., SAUR International S.A. & León Participaciones S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ¶ 74 
(June 25, 2008) (“As explained above, the leading international arbitration rules are broadly similar. 
Despite slight textual differences, tribunals have not tended to give them markedly different effect. To 
justify the removal of an arbitrator, the petitioner’s doubts must be justifiable on some objective basis, 
reasonable by the standard of a fair minded, rational, objective observer.”). See also Bernasconi-
Osterwalder et al., supra note 5, at 5 (“As this note explains, however, notwithstanding the different lan-
guage used in the arbitration rules, the standards that have emerged for judging arbitrator challenges are 
today rather uniform. The textual variations are not the source of the problem.”). 
 97  Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence In ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 131, 136 
(Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009). 
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(a) Independence and impartiality: The first point of the arbitral com-
mon law of independence refers to the distinction between independence 
and impartiality. According to Suez et al. v. Argentina “independence re-
lates to the lack of relations with a party that might influence an arbitrator’s 
decision. Impartiality, on the other hand, concerns the absence of bias or 
predisposition toward one of the parties.”98 The Tribunal reflects a common 
perception in international arbitration and in domestic and international case 
law and practice. The two notions, commonly collectively referred to as 
“bias,”99 are considered to constitute one standard that has to be read into 
texts, like that of the ICSID, where both notions are not written down ex-
pressis verbis. The ICSID tribunals have consistently followed this ap-
proach.100 
There are three possible grounds of dependence and partiality of an ar-
bitrator and accordingly three general grounds to challenge an arbitrator that 
will not be discussed further here: (i) a personal, professional, or financial 
relationship between an arbitrator and a party; (ii) a similar relationship be-
tween arbitrator and counsel; and (iii) issue and subject-matter conflicts.101 
b. Three types of provisions: Second, the independence standard has to 
be distilled from three different types of provisions in the relevant arbitra-
tion rules. In all arbitration rules, there are provisions and rules regarding: 
(1) the qualifications of arbitrators, which refers to the obligation of inde-
pendence and impartiality of the arbitrators described in the previous para-
graphs;102 (ii) disclosure (and investigation), primarily concerning possible 
 
 98  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua 
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on a Second Proposal for the Dis-
qualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, and AWG Group Limited v. Republic of Argentina 
(UNCITRAL Arbitration), ¶ 28 (May 12, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0812.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & Vivendi Universal S.A. 
v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification 
of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0811_0.pdf; see also Sheppard, supra note 97, at 133 (“The terms ‘independent’ and ‘im-
partial’ are not synonymous. In broad terms, the former refers to the lack of connection with a particular 
party whilst the latter refers to a predisposition or favouritism”). 
 99  See generally Brekoulakis, supra note 5 (discussing questions of implicit and systemic bias be-
yond apparent bias of individual adjudicators).  
 100 See Burlington Resources, Inc. v.  Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶¶ 65–66 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf.  
 101 Sheppard, supra note 96, at 138 passim; Federica Cristani, Challenge and Disqualification of 
Arbitrators in International Investment Arbitration: An Overview, 13 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS & 
TRIBUNALS 153, 154 (2014).  
 102 Qualifications rules: ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 14(a); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. GAOR 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/465, art. 11 (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]; PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES, art. 6(3) (Dec. 17, 
2012), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/PCA%20Arbitration%20Rules%202012_20130804%20Enga61a.pdf?fil_id=2309 (issued pur-
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conflicts of interest; 103 and (iii) challenge.104 These three different types of 
provisions give an overall understanding of the legal framework for the in-
dependence of the arbitrator and have to be read as a whole with a view to 
the applicable independence standard. 
c. The applicable standard: Third, one common test of the independ-
ence of international arbitrators seems to prevail across the arbitral fora. 
Trying to distil a standard of review for the independence of international 
arbitrators, the following pattern of analysis has been identified in the rele-
vant documents, case law and literature: 
• Standard: What is the appropriate standard of independence? 
• Intensity: What is the intensity of the standard? 
• Point of view: Based on the understanding of whom? 
Based on this pattern, the test concerning the independence of interna-
tional arbitrators proposed by the majority of the arbitration community and 
relevant scholarship is: 
• Standard: “appearance of bias” 
• Intensity: mere possibility of bias 
• Point of view: “reasonable and informed observer/third party” 
(objective) 
The usual basis for a review of independence in the arbitral common 
law is the appearance of bias test which refers to the reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias by the judging authority.105 The appearance of bias is not the 
 
suant to Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 19, 1899, 36 Stat. 
2199 and Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199) 
[hereinafter PCA ARBITRATION RULES]; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION 
RULES, arts. 11(1), 15(2) (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-
adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES]; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 14(1) (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf [hereinafter SCC 
ARBITRATION RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, RULES, art. 14.1 (2014), 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [hereinafter LCIA 
RULES]; see also IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Principle 1; cf. also U.N. COMM. ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH 
AMENDMENTS AS AMENDED IN 2006, arts. 11.5, 12, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006). 
 103 Disclosure rules: ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 102, art. 6(2); UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 102, art. 11; PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 11; ICC ARBITRATION 
Rules, supra note 102, arts. 11(2), (3); SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, arts. 14(2), (3); LCIA 
RULES, supra note 102, art. 5.3; see also IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Standards 3, 7; cf. also 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 12(1). The IBA Guidelines are the only international arbitration document 
to deal that extensively with conflicts of interest. 
 104 Challenge rules: ICSID Convention, supra note 8, arts. 57, 58; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 102, arts. 12, 13; PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 12; ICC ARBITRATION 
Rules, supra note 102, art. 14; SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 15; LCIA RULES, supra 
note 102, art. 10; cf. also UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 12(1). 
 105 Appearance of bias is different from actual bias. According to Van Harten, actual bias in interna-
tional investment arbitration is “whether arbitrators individually or as a group are influenced by inap-
propriate factors in the resolution of legal issues or disputes.” Gus Van Harten, Contributions and Limi-
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same as actual bias. The question that has to be asked is whether there are 
justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator. 
The application of the appearance of bias test by international investment 
arbitration tribunals brings international arbitration closer to a judicial pro-
cess and makes the arbitration process compatible with generally acceptable 
independence standards like that of Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.106 
A recent decision referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration Sec-
retary-General Christiaan Kröner—which, in contrast to many previous de-
cisions, was made public—shows how the relevant standard has started to 
be applied in international investment law.107 In Perenco v. Ecuador, the 
parties had assented to a special Agreement that the Secretary-General of 
the PCA would resolve any arbitrator challenges.108 Additionally, for the 
first time in an investment case, the parties had agreed that the applicable 
law would be the IBA Guidelines.109 The issue arose out of a published in-
terview of the claimants’ arbitrator, Judge Charles Brower. In this inter-
view, Judge Brower made comments about Ecuador and about the pending 
ICSID proceedings. The respondents filed the disqualification request based 
on these comments. From the outset, the Tribunal made clear what the 
standard of review was: “The relevant question in resolving this challenge 
under the IBA Guidelines is whether the interview comments constitute cir-
cumstances that, ‘from a reasonable third person’s point of view having 
knowledge of the relevant facts, give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbi-
trator’s impartiality or independence.’”110 In applying this standard, the 
PCA Secretary-General said that the combination of the words chosen by 
Judge Brower—especially the word “recalcitrant”—and the context in 
which he used the words, would give a reasonable and informed third party 
justifiable doubts as to Judge Brower’s impartiality towards Ecuador;111 the 
same applied to the further claim on the risk of prejudgment concerning 
Judge Brower’s view on whether Ecuador’s actions constitute an expropria-
 
tations of Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in International Investment Arbitration, 
1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, no. 4, 2011, at 1, 5. 
 106 COTTON, supra note 5, at 1 (citing to British case law). 
 107 In the Matter of a Challenge to be Decided by The Secretary-General of the Permanent Court Of 
Arbitration Pursuant to an Agreement Concluded on October 2, 2008, PCA Case No. IR-2009/1 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2009), appealing by agreement from Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic Of Ecuador & Em-
presa Estatal Pertoleos Del Ecuador (“Petroecuador”), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision On Chal-
lenge To Arbitrator (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/PerencovEcuador-Challenge.pdf 
[hereinafter Peru v. Ecuador]. 
 108 See generally Andrea Martignoni, Louise Jenkins & Hop Dang, Focus: ICSID Arbitrator Dis-
qualified For Comments in Media, ALLENS LINKLATERS: ARBITRATION (Mar. 2, 2010), 
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/arb/foarb2mar10.htm. 
 109 Perenco v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. IR-2009/1, ¶  2. 
 110 Id. ¶ 4. 
 111 Id. ¶¶ 48–53. 
36_2_3_DIMITROPOULOS FINAL.doc (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/30/16  3:18 PM 




 3. The Peculiarities of the ICSID Framework 
A similar pattern of analysis and standard of independence applies also 
to ICSID arbitration.113 However, the language of some ICSID Convention 
causes some confusion since there seems to be a deviation in several im-
portant respects from the common standard and test described above. 
 (a) The text of the ICSID Convention and beyond 
a. Independence and impartiality: With regard to independence and 
impartiality, there is no mention of impartiality in the English or French 
versions of the ICSID Convention. Nonetheless, “imparcialidad de juicio” 
is mentioned in the Spanish version of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention. 
This is one of the reasons that ICSID case law, beginning with the Suez et 
al. v. Argentina award mentioned earlier, reads the impartiality standard in 
the text of the ICSID Convention.114 
b. Three types of provisions: The same set of independence and impar-
tiality guarantees that has been identified in other fields of international ar-
bitration can be also traced here. Concerning the qualifications of ICSID 
arbitrators, Article 14 of the ICSID Convention provides: 
[P]ersons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high 
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitra-
tors.115 
An additional independence guarantee, which is a peculiarity of ICSID 
vis-à-vis many international courts, is the provision on the nationality of ar-
 
 112 Id. ¶¶ 54–58. 
 113 LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, supra note 5, at 475 (“One of 
the things that the members of the relatively small pool of ICSID arbitrators have in common is that they 
either used to (or still) serve as arbitrators in strictly private international commercial disputes. They 
therefore carry the customs of ICA, which include the ‘justifiable doubts’ (or ‘reasonable apprehension,’ 
as it is usually read) standard, in their briefcases when they cross over into ISA.”). 
 114 See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S. A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (Oct. 3 2001), ¶ 14, 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0208.pdf. 
 115 See also ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, art. 14(2) (“The Chairman, in designat-
ing persons to serve on the Panels, shall in addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring repre-
sentation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic 
activity.”); ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceed-
ings, Rule 6(2). 
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bitrators. In contrast, for example to the ICJ, ITLOS and other international 
tribunals’ provisions, no arbitrators that have the same nationality as the 
parties are allowed on the tribunal.116 
The disclosure rule of Article 6(2) ICSID Arbitration Rules does not 
present any major differences in comparison to the rules of the other arbitral 
fora since it includes the standard arbitrator declaration of independence. 
The challenge rule of the ICSID Convention is laid out in Article 57: 
A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the disqualifica-
tion of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a mani-
fest lack of the qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 14. A 
party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the dis-
qualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for 
appointment to the Tribunal under Section 2 of Chapter IV.117 
Article 57 mentions the need for the existence of “facts,” in contrast to 
“appearances” or “circumstances,” indicating a manifest lack, in contrast to 
reasonable lack, of the qualities of an arbitrator. Here we see the major dif-
ference, at least textually, between the ICSID and the other arbitration rules. 
There seems to be in ICSID a higher threshold for a successful challenge 
than under alternative regimes.118 The question is whether “manifest” de-
scribes how seriously an arbitrator lacks one of the necessary qualities or 
whether it describes standard of proof to which the lack must be estab-
lished.119 
In ICSID, a proposal for disqualification by one of the parties shall 
take place “promptly,” and in any event, before a proceeding is declared 
closed.120 The rules of the other arbitration fora set specific limits, like the 
thirty-day rule under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules121 and 
 
 116 There is a similar provision in Article 13(5) of the International Chamber of Commerce arbitra-
tion rules, which provides that “the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be of a 
nationality other than those of the parties.” Nathan, supra note 5, at 19 (“the rationale for the ICSID 
Rule and the ICC Rule (to a lesser extent) in regard to nationalities of arbitrators is unclear to me in this 
age of mass migrations, involuntary transfers of peoples, and political and economic refugees because 
nationality can often be a matter of accident and convenience than choice.”). See generally Ilhyung Lee, 
Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603 
(2008). 
 117 ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, art. 57 (emphasis added); see also id., art. 58. 
 118 Crawford, supra note 5, at 1. 
 119 Id. at 2 (“But even if we accept this second approach, there remains a further question: the mean-
ing of ‘manifest’. Some tribunals have considered the pertinent inquiry to be whether the evidence of 
unreliability is manifest, meaning that it is clear. Others have considered the inquiry to be whether the 
degree of the unreliability is manifest: here ‘manifest’ means serious.”). 
 120 ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, 
Rule 9(1). 
 121 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 14(2). 
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the IBA Guidelines122 and the fifteen-day rule (counting from the date when 
the parties learned of the potential conflict of interest) under the 
UNCITRAL123 and SCC124 Rules. 
A further peculiarity of the ICSID framework is that independence and 
impartiality may constitute a ground for annulment by the ad hoc commit-
tees.125 Additionally, in contrast to other arbitral rules126 which provide that 
a challenge shall be determined by the appointing authority, the ICSID rules 
provide that disqualification proposals are decided by the unchallenged ar-
bitrators, and by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council in the 
case of their disagreement.127 
The applicable standard: The peculiarities of the ICSID arbitration 
framework created problems regarding the applicable test and standard for 
the evaluation of the independence of ICSID arbitrators. The language of 
Article 57 of the ICSID Convention creates the impression that it establish-
es a less strict test than the common “appearance of bias” test identified 
above.128 According to Luttrell: “The ICSID test for bias is therefore 
unique: the inter-operation of Articles 14(1) and 57 produce a rule that an 
ICSID arbitrator may only be challenged for bias where he or she manifest-
ly lacks the capacity to exercise independent judgment. As far as I am 
aware, no other arbitral institution or law uses this test.”129 
 (b) The Recent Case Law 
As Judge James Crawford rightly observes, there are two lines of case 
law in ICSID arbitration.130 One line of case law begins with the first Suez 
decision in 2007 and seems to be closer to the letter of the ICSID Conven-
 
 122 IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and 
Disclosure 4(a).  
 123 U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS AMENDED IN 2006, art. 13(1), U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2006). 
 124 SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102,  art.15(2).  
 125 See ICSID, BACKGROUND PAPER ON ANNULMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF 
ICSID 447 (2012). According to Luttrell, “[i]n an ICSID proceeding, the only post-award opportunity to 
plead bias is by motion for annulment under Article 52(1)(d).” Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-
State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 457. According to Pinsole, at least three of the five grounds of Article 
52(1)—(a), (c) and (d)—can be used to raise issues of independence and impartiality of the members of 
an arbitral tribunal. Philippe Pinsole, The Challenge of Awards Rendered by Biased Arbitrators – Do 
Not Lose Your Rights, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2008). 
 126 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 102, art. 12. 
 127 ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 58. 
 128 See supra Section I.B.2. 
 129 Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 458; see also CHRISTOPH 
H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1201–02 (2d ed. 2009); Sheppard, 
supra note 97, at 132. 
 130 Crawford, supra note 5. 
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tion.131This case law is in contrast to the earlier line of case law, first decid-
ed by the unchallenged arbitrators of an ad hoc Committee, that follows a 
modified appearance of bias test beyond the strict letter of the ICSID Con-
vention—132 which is the common standard for the assessment of independ-
ence in international arbitration. Most cases since 2012 have not followed 
the Suez approach. Applying the scheme of analysis described above, the 
Suez case law is based on the following test: 
• Standard of review: manifest lack 
• Intensity: high probability of bias based on facts 
• Point of view: reasonable observer/third party (objective) 
The ICSID independence test based on the separate line of case law 
can be simplified as follows: 
• Standard of review: appearance of bias 
• Intensity: manifest lack of bias (“obvious” or “evident”) 
• Point of view: reasonable observer/third party (objective) 
In order to distill the current status of interpretation of the ICSID inde-
pendence standard, the present study presents some data on ICSID disquali-
fication cases, focusing primarily on cases from 2012 to 2014 not previous-
ly considered by other authors.133 In the 2012 to 2014 period we observe an 
explosion of cases,134 changes on the deciding authorities, and increases in 
 
 131 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua 
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on a Second Proposal for the Dis-
qualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, and AWG Group Limited v. Republic of Argentina 
(UNCITRAL Arbitration), ¶ 28 (May 12, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0812.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. 
v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification 
of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0811_0.pdf; see also Nations Energy Corporation, Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc. 
&Jamie Jurado v. The Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Challenge to Dr. Stanimir A. 
Alexandrov (on the Annulment Committee) (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0561.pdf; ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier Q.C., Arbitrator 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0223.pdf. 
 132 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. The Republic of Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (Oct. 3, 2001), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0208.pdf; Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to 
Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8 ICSID Rep. 398 (2005). This line is followed by most decisions 
on disqualification proposals since 2012, including Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, supra note 25, and RSM 
Production Corp. v. Saint Lucia, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal for the Disqualification of Dr. Gavan 
Griffith QC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10 (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/italaw4062.pdf. 
 133 DAELE, supra note 10. 
 134 In total there are 15 cases—2 in 2012, 5 in 2013 and 8 in 2014. Cases from ICSID Tribunals in 
the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 that are not included in Daele’s study. From 2012:  
1. ConocoPhillips Company et al., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30; 
2. Getma International et al. v. Republic of Guinea, Décision sur la Demande en Récusation de 
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disqualification proposals being upheld.135 
 
Monsieur Bernardo M. Cremades, Arbitre, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29 (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1068.pdf; 
From 2013: 
3. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on 
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13 (Feb. 27, 
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1311.pdf; 
4. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5 
(not published, reported June 14, 2013); 
5. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, De-
cision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No. 
ARB 12/20 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3009.pdf; 
6. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualifica-
tion of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 (formerly Burlington 
Resources Inc. & others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador 
(PetroEcuador)) (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0106.pdf; 
7. Repsol, S.A. & Repsol Butano, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Decisión Sobre la Propuesta de 
Recusación a la Mayoría del Tribunal [Decision on the Disqualification Proposal of the Ma-
jority of the Tribunal], ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3033.pdf. 
From 2014:  
8. Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2, Resignation of Professor Philippe Sands (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3045.pdf;  
9. Abaclat & Others v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority 
of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly Giovanna a Beccara & Others v. The 
Argentine Republic) (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3057.pdf;  
10. Koch Minerals Sàrl & Koch Nitrogen International Sàrl v. The Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, Decision on Respondent’s Challenge to Judge Florentino Feliciano, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/19 (not published, reported Feb. 24, 2014);  
11. Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Decision 
on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13 (Mar. 
20, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf; 
12. ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. & ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria 
B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority 
of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30 (May 5, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3162.pdf.pdf; 
13. Transban Investments Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/24 
(not published, reported May 13, 2014); 
14. İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify 
Professor Philippe Sands, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24 (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3260.pdf; 
15. RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal for the Disquali-
fication of Dr. Gavan Griffith QC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10 (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4062.pdf. 
 135 Moreover, there is at least one reported UNCITRAL disqualification award that upholds a dis-
qualification challenge during 2013–2014, namely CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauri-
tius Private Limited & Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Deci-
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There have been fifty disqualification cases in ICSID since 1982,136 
fourteen of which occurred during the studied period from the end of 2012 
until 2014. This accounts for 28% of the cases. These cases concern a total 
of sixty-eight arbitrators; twenty-two arbitrators, i.e., more than 32%, were 
challenged during this period. The interesting shift in the discussed period 
takes place with regard to the deciding authority. From the three deciding 
authorities of the ICSID framework, the unchallenged arbitrators have de-
cided in the final instance twenty-four cases in total, of which six occurred 
from late 2012 until the end of 2014. During these years, the Chairman of 
the ICSID Administrative Council decided the majority of cases, constitut-
ing nine of the fourteen cases he has decided since 1982.137 Moreover, there 
have been eleven resignations in the history of ICSID arbitration, with two 
arbitrators resigning between 2013 and 2014. 
Figure 1 presents the described results, based on data gathered by Ka-
rel Daele until 2012138 and data gathered by the author from late 2012 
through 2014: 
 
sion on the Respondent’s Challenge to the Hon. Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francis-
co Orrego Vicuna as Co-Arbitrator, PCA Case No. 2013-09 (Sept. 30, 2013) (sustaining the challenge 
brought against the arbitrator appointed by the claimant, Francisco Orrego Vicuña, and dismissing the 
challenge of the Chairperson, Marc Lalonde); the decision in the case was taken by the President of the 
ICJ, Judge Peter Tomka. 
 136 The first one was in the case Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1, 
Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (not published, reported June 24, 1982).  
 137 The remaining members of the ad hoc Committee have rendered two decisions in total, none of 
which occurred in the last two years. 
 138 DAELE, supra note 10, 455. 
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FIGURE 1: ICSID DISQUALIFICATION CASES 
 
A constant decisional pattern can be observed until 2012. The unchal-
lenged arbitrators decided disqualification challenges against twenty-two 
arbitrators. They rejected the claims for eighteen arbitrators, whereas they 
disqualified no fellow arbitrator. The cases against four arbitrators were 
equally decided and then sent to the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council. The Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council has dismissed 
nine disqualification motions, whereas he disqualified one arbitrator. 
This pattern changes in the studied period. Respondents challenged fif-
teen times and claimants challenged seven times. Chairpersons have been 
challenged four times, whereas three arbitrators in total were disqualified. 
The high rate of challenges by the claimants is a recent development. It was 
originally hypothesized in international investment arbitration that respond-
ents would have the tendency to challenge an arbitrator for the purpose of 
delaying the proceeding and final award, but claimants would have the gen-
eral tendency to try and avoid challenges to reduce costs and increase the 
speed of arriving to a result.139 The recent developments have also put this 
 
 139 See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 506. It is not common for parties to challenge the arbitrator that 
they have appointed; there are at least two exceptions prior to 2012: Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd. 
v. Independent Power Tanzania Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8 (July 20, 2001); Walter Bau AG (In 
Liquidation) v. The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award (July 1, 2009), ¶¶ 1.36–1.42, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/429-2009.case.1/IIC429(2009)D.pdf. In both cases, the 
arbitrators resigned voluntarily after the challenge. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 510 n.42. The Chairman 
of ICSID Administrative Council rejected recently a challenge by Venezuela against its party-appointed 
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assumption to test. 
 
TABLE 1: DISQUALIFICATION PROPOSALS 2012–2014 
 
 v. Chairperson v. C-Arbitrator v. R-Arbitrator Total 
Respondent 4 10 1 15 
Claimant 0 0 7 7 
Total 4 10 8  
 
Table 1 shows the disqualification proposals filed in the studied period 
late 2012–2014 by respondents and claimants. “v. Chairperson” indicates 
that the proposal has been filed against the Chairperson of a Tribunal. “v. 
C-Arbitrator” indicates that the proposal has been filed against the arbitrator 
appointed by the claimant; “v. R-arbitrator” indicates that the proposal has 
been filed against the arbitrator appointed by the respondent 
Except for the two resignations during 2013–2014, the unchallenged 
arbitrators have decided far fewer cases than in the past. Given that the arbi-
trators are members of the same community, it has recently become very 
difficult for members of the same panel to decide the cases against their fel-
low arbitrators. Five out of six challenges decided by the co-arbitrators 
were rejected and three equally decided. But, very importantly the two re-
maining co-arbitrators of the Caratube Tribunal upheld—for the first time 
in the history of international investment arbitration—the disqualification of 
a third arbitrator.140 In Caratube, the unchallenged arbitrators disqualified 
the arbitrator of the respondent state since he was sitting in different but 
similar cases and might have acquired knowledge of facts of the case.141 
It seems improbable that this result would have been achieved without 
the previous decisions of the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Coun-
cil. Recent cases verify the trend in ICSID towards outsourcing the deci-
sions to disqualify to neutral institutions like the Chairman of the Adminis-
trative Council of ICSID, i.e., the President of the World Bank, from whom 
a case may be further referred to other deciding authorities. A case may be 
referred to a different deciding authority than the remaining arbitrators ei-
ther if the parties agree or if the unchallenged arbitrators could not reach a 
commonly agreed decision.142 Even though not legally obliged, when the 
 
arbitrator in Koch v. Venezuela, supra note 131. 
 140 See Chiara Giorgetti, Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold 
Disqualification of Third Arbitrator, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/22/caratube-v-kazakhstan-first-time-two-icsid-arbitrators-
uphold (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 141 Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch (Mar. 20, 
2014), ¶¶ 71–91, 109–10, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf. 
 142 See ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 58. From the sample in late 2012–2014, the unchal-
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Chairman does not consider it appropriate to make the decision on his own 
or just to seek recommendation by the ICSID Secretary General,143 he will 
usually refer the issue to the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, beyond the text of the ICSID Convention.144  The Chairman of 
the Administrative Council of ICSID, Jim Yong Kim, decided the majority 
of the fourteen disqualification proposals in the relevant period. The Chair-
man dismissed twelve challenges and upheld two.145 
As a result of the efforts of the arbitration community to establish a 
high substantive standard of independence in its interface with other actors 
involved in international investment arbitration, an independence and im-
partiality standard for international investment arbitrators coalesced in the 
case law over the last two years. According to the new rule from Caratube 
v. Kazakhstan, the claimants must show that a third party would find that 
there is an evident or obvious appearance of lack of impartiality or inde-
pendence based on a reasonable evaluation of the facts of the case.146 This 
is a new standard beyond Articles 57 and 14 ICSID Convention, but also 
beyond appearance of bias as applied in the other fora. The tribunals have 
rejected the need to prove an actual dependence or bias of the arbitrators, 
but at the same time, and in contrast to the common appearance of bias test, 
they have set a higher burden of proof in that the appearances have to be 
manifest, i.e., evident, or obvious.147 
As we shall see in the following section, this approach is an aspect of 
the constructed development of international investment law and arbitra-
tion. The whole field is being constructed through a process of communica-
tion within the arbitration community that applies the relevant law with the 
other actors that are involved in the field. 
 III. CONSTRUCTING AN INDEPENDENCE STANDARD FOR 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
International courts and arbitral tribunals have a different design. What 
is the difference between the safeguards of international courts and the 
 
lenged arbitrators could not reach a commonly agreed decision in Getma v. Guinea, Burlington v. Ecua-
dor, and Koch v. Venezuela.  
 143 DAELE, supra note 10, at 176. 
 144 See Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 162; DAELE, supra note 10, at 176. 
 145 In one case, the proposal to disqualify was rejected based on the condition that the arbitrator, Mr. 
Bottini, completes, signs, and transmits to the ICSID Secretary-General a new Declaration under Rule 6 
of ICSID Arbitration Rules. See Saint-Gobain v. Venezuela, supra note 131. 
 146 Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on 
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13 (Feb. 27, 2013), 
¶ 57, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1311.pdf. 
 147 Also according to Schreuer, the term “manifest” in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention imposes 
“a relatively heavy burden on the party making the proposal.” See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 129, at 
1202 . 
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safeguards of international arbitral tribunals? In order to understand this 
question better, the distinction between organizational and functional guar-
antees that was drawn in Part II.B.1 is useful. This analysis showed that in 
comparison to other international adjudication bodies, ICSID and other in-
vestment tribunals are constituted under lower formal guarantees of inde-
pendence than international courts. International courts are standing courts 
with (a majority of) permanent judges. The arbitral tribunals are not stand-
ing and are composed of individuals with different backgrounds that com-
pete for the same positions on a global arbitrators market.148 
Within the arbitral tribunals, there are largely the same personal guar-
antees of independence. Typical functional guarantees are qualifications of 
the adjudicators, challenge rules, and rules on disclosure (and investiga-
tion), primarily concerning possible conflicts of interest.149 On the other 
side, there are no organizational safeguards of independence in the arbitra-
tion tribunals.150 This is probably why the ICSID Convention focuses on in-
dependent decision making and not generically on independence: Article 
14(1) (and Article 40) of the ICSID Convention speaks about “independent 
judgment” of the persons designated to serve on the Panels and not about 
the independence of the arbitral tribunal. The focus is thus on the function-
al, rather than organizational, guarantees of arbitrators’ independence. 
But, the differentiation between organizational and functional guaran-
tees of judicial independence, while uncommon in arbitration tribunals, is 
not unique to international investment arbitration. In international law, there 
is not a single model for the “international judge.”151 As will be explained 
in this section, party-appointment is a feature of the design of adjudication 
fora that is largely shared by international courts and international arbitral 
tribunals.152 The only difference between the two types of dispute resolution 
fora is the number of the party-appointed adjudicators. The party-appointed 
adjudicators bring their specific knowledge of the case, the facts, and in-
 
 148 See also Anja Seibert-Fohr, International Judicial Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 757, 761–62 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 
2014) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 
(1930)); Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 179. 
 149 Repeating what has been presented in previous Sections, the provisions comparable to Article 14 
of the ICSID Convention are: Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 40(1); DSU, supra note 59, art. 8(2); 
ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 2(1); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 2. 
 150 Cf. also Van Harten, supra note 105, at 3–4; Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmet-
rical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration 9 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. 
Comp. Res. in Law & Pol. Econ., Research Paper No. 41, 2012) (citing Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Do-
nelson, Creating Quality Courts, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 490, 498 (2010) and Rogers, supra note 
22, at 56–57). 
 151 See Erik Voeten, International Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 550, 560 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 
2014).   
 152 See, e.g., the judges ad hoc of Article 31(2) of the ICJ Statute. 
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deed the overall situation of the party into the dispute resolution process 
and are an invaluable feature of international law. The right to an independ-
ent adjudicator is accompanied in international law by the right to a “case-
sensitive adjudicator.”153 
Overall, only some of the judicial independence variables that were 
presented above are applicable to arbitral tribunals. Still, international in-
vestment tribunals apply the same substantive standard of independence as 
domestic and international courts. This section deals with the question of 
how this result has been achieved in the absence of organizational rules of 
independence. As we shall see, this is largely the result of an interplay be-
tween the rules established by the arbitration community, their de facto in-
fluence, and their institutionalization. 
 A. Interplay Between Legal and Societal Rules: A Race to the Top 
 1. The Ethics of Independence and the International Arbitration 
Community 
According to Professors Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, there is an 
important convergence among the individuals in the system of international 
business transactions and commercial arbitration that refers to the identity 
of the key players, the definition of international commercial arbitration, 
and how it has changed in the past.154 The development of the high standard 
of arbitral independence can be understood as a transition from old to new 
forms of international arbitration.155 Dezalay and Garth describe the chang-
es in international commercial arbitration as a conflict between two genera-
tions of arbitrators: “grand old men” versus “technocrats.”156 Their conflict 
and “symbolic battle” is complemented by that between academics and 
practitioners in the field.157 The shift from one generation to the other also 
signifies a shift from “relatively informal arbitration” into “offshore litiga-
tion.”158 According to Dezalay and Garth, the practice of international arbi-
 
 153 See also Voeten, supra note 151, at 554 (“Still, the home-state bias is manageable and may be 
outweighed by the benefits of expertise and languages abilities such judges bring to the table. How this 
trade-off works out depends on the institutional insulation of judges and the context of each court.”).   
 154 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing Inter-
national Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 27, 
33 (1995). 
 155 See DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 3–30 (describing the evolution of 
the international arbitration community); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryan Garth, Dealing in Virtue, in 
CONDUCTING LAW AND SOCIAL RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON METHODS AND PRACTICES 200 (Simon 
Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2009); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation Of The International Arbi-
trator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005). 
 156 DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 34–41. 
 157 Id. at 41–42. 
 158 Id. at 54–57. 
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tration is based on the characteristics of the generation of arbitrators that 
dominated arbitration during this period159 with consequences for the appli-
cable independence standard.160 
Arbitration was the dispute resolution mechanism of the medieval Law 
Merchant of traders (lex mercatoria). In medieval times, arbitrators were 
not expected to be independent or impartial.161 During the late 19th and ear-
ly 20th century, arbitration was inherited as a practice by the European 
higher classes. These grand, old men were primarily senior European pro-
fessors imbued with the traditional values of the European legal elites. They 
considered that arbitration could not be regarded as a profession. In the late 
1970s, there was a change in the persons who acted as arbitrators and, con-
sequently, in the nature of the practice.162 Increased competition among ar-
bitrators led to the professionalization of arbitration. These trends have also 
led to an increasing emphasis on independence and impartiality. 
The change of persons was coupled with some institutional changes. 
The partial change in the persons of arbitrators was first accompanied by 
the appearance and gradual increase in arbitration houses. The arbitral insti-
tutions and their dispute resolution fora have a long history beginning at the 
end of the 19th century. For example, the London Court of International 
Arbitration (under its previous name) was created in 1892,163 the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration in 1923,164 and the Arbi-
tration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in 1917.165 The 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of 1923 and 1955 contained no 
mention of either independence or impartiality, nor did they contain provi-
sions for the challenge of an arbitrator. The multiplication and diversifica-
tion of places and institutions for arbitrations led to further competition.166 
The arbitral institutions adapted to increased competition by introducing in-
dependence and impartiality into the arbitral rules. In 1975, the requirement 
that “every arbitrator must be and remain ‘independent’ of ‘the parties in-
volved in the arbitration’” was added to Article 7(1) of the International 
Chamber of Commerce Rules.167 In 2012, the International Chamber of 
 
 159 Id. at 34. 
 160 Id. at 48–51. 
 161 Alec Stone Sweet, Islands of Transnational Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 323, 330 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002). 
 162 DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 39–40.  
 163 History, LONDON CT. INT’L ARB., http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 
2015). 
 164 The Merchants of Peace, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/about-
icc/history/the-merchants-of-peace/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 165 About the SCC, ARB. INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/about-the-scc/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 166 DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 44.  
 167 YVES DERAINS & ERIC A SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 117 (2d ed. 
2005). 
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Commerce again changed its rules to include both independence and impar-
tiality in Articles 11 and 14(1) of its Rules.168 
A further institutional variable in this development is the entrance into 
the market, predominantly in the late 1970s, of the more commercial An-
glo-American law firms with their adversarial style of litigation.169 This 
change had a great effect on the understanding of the independence of in-
ternational arbitrators. The right to an independent and impartial judge is a 
basic principle of due process in common law, and U.S. litigators are very 
well-trained in raising it.170 The European Convention of Human Rights of 
1950 must have also had a similar influence on European lawyers. 
In a continuous race to the top, the most complete manifestation of the 
willingness of the arbitration community to be and appear to be independent 
are the International Bar Association’s “Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration,”171 which are practically identical on the issues 
of functional independence and impartiality to the statutes of international 
courts and “The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the Inter-
national Judiciary.”172 
 2. Arbitration Between Sovereigns and Migration to Investment 
Arbitration 
The history of the development of international commercial arbitration 
and the international arbitration community is just the one side of the story 
of achieving the personal independence of international investment arbitra-
tors since there have always been two types of international arbitration. 
Apart from commercial arbitration between private parties, international ar-
bitration has always existed as a mechanism to resolve disputes between 
sovereigns.173 The Jay Treaty of 1794 can be considered as establishing 
modern arbitration between sovereigns.174 
 
 168 Richard Power, Briefing Note on ICC Rule Changes, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 6, 
2011) http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/10/06/briefing-note-on-icc-rule-changes/. 
 169 DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 54–57.  
 170 See Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 445. 
 171 INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 17. 
 172 Burgh House Principles, supra note 18. 
 173 See Brown, supra note 58, at 66–86; see generally David W. Rivkin, The Impact of International 
Arbitration on the Rule of Law – The 2012 Clayton Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration 
Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 327 (2013). 
 174 Rivkin, supra note 173, at 334–36; see also Christine Grey & Benedict Kingsbury, Inter-State 
Arbitration Since 1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 55, 57 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); Posner & Yoo, supra note 57, at 30–33 (using data from 
A.M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, 1794–1989 (3d ed. 1990) on arbitration be-
tween sovereigns). According to Posner and Yoo, the pattern that emerges from the study of the data of 
the period from 1794 (when the Jay Treaty was signed) until 1970 (when international courts started 
proliferating) shows that large countries and Latin American countries used arbitration more frequently. 
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Adapted to the needs of the international legal order of the time, this 
type of public international arbitration had a more diplomatic and political 
than judicial nature.175 Just like commercial arbitration, neither the Conven-
tion for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 that established the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration nor the Convention of 1907 contained express 
provisions on independence or impartiality. Article 23 of the 1899 Treaty 
simply introduced the list system that was inherited by the ICSID Conven-
tion and included a provision similar to the requirements provisions that are 
included in current treaties and arbitration rules.176 
The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes of 1966 brings the two traditions of international arbitration togeth-
er.177 The same applies to the independence guarantee. Drawing inspiration 
from provisions in the World Court statute,178 the introduction of a standard 
of independence in Articles 14 and 57 ICSID Convention was a step to-
wards recognizing independent arbitration internationally. At the same 
time, the contracting states went about independence in a very modest way. 
As explained above, they only refer to independence as opposed to “inde-
pendence and impartiality,” which is the usual standard of judicial inde-
pendence.179 Additionally, the text of Article 57 of the ICSID Convention 
does not provide for the appearance of bias test, but only for the “manifest 
lack” test. 
A sociological analysis of international investment arbitration helps us 
reconsider the independence standard,180 and better understand why the ap-
pearance of bias test has been established in the frame of international in-
vestment arbitration including ICSID tribunals beyond the text of Article 
57. The ICSID Convention is an international treaty established by states. 
Yet, it is not the states that apply the treaty, but the international arbitration 
 
“Commissions” were usually used for civil insurrections, war damages, and personal claims, while 
“Heads of State” usually decided on arbitrary acts and maritime seizures. Id. at 32. 
 175 Brown, supra note 58, at 65.  
 176 In accordance with Article 3 ICSID Convention, ICSID maintains a list of arbitrators consisting 
of two parts: Part I consists of designations by the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID 
according to Article 13(2) ICSID Convention), and  Part II consisting of designations by Contracting 
States according to Article 13(1) ICSID Convention. The list is not closed and the Convention parties 
are free to appoint arbitrators from outside the list. 
 177 See generally ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012). 
 178 The independence standards of all international courts and tribunals, including the ICSID provi-
sions, are largely based on the example of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the ICJ; see 
Oellers-Frahm, supra note 51, at 7; see also Brown, supra note 58, at 66–86 
 179 See supra Section I.B. 
 180 Cf. also Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 143 (Zachary Douglas et al. 
eds., 2014); Moshe Hirsch, The Interaction between International Investment Law and Human Rights 
Treaties: A Sociological Perspective, in MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
211 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011); see also Reisman, supra note 84 (discussing interna-
tional investment arbitration as a “system”). 
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community. Table 2 presents the nationalities of arbitrators based on a da-
taset on international investment arbitration gathered by Professor Alec 
Stone Sweet et al. including data until December 31, 2013.181 It shows that 
Western Europeans, especially Swiss and French arbitrators, dominate the 
field of international investment arbitration, followed by U.S. Americans.182 
 
TABLE 2: ARBITRATOR NATIONALITY 
 




Arbitrators 272 118 15 30 47 
Cases 
Chaired 249 128 30 25 15 
 
It is largely the same community of people that deals with internation-
al investment cases in the international investment fora as in commercial 
arbitration. First, the international arbitration community evolves over the 
years in the frame of international commercial arbitration. Then, it migrates 
to investment arbitration. The individuals of this community have trans-
posed their ethos and professional practices onto the investment law regime 
and arbitration.183 The international arbitration community in the search for 
legitimacy and maximization of profits applies the higher standard of arbi-
tral independence also to international investment arbitration,184 despite the 
lack of international rules on organizational independence of arbitrators and 
beyond the text of Article 14.185 
 
 181 Dataset on file with the author. 
 182 Arbitrators with dual citizenship are double-counted.  
 183 See also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 475 (“One of the 
things that the members of the relatively small pool of ICSID arbitrators have in common is that they 
either used to (or still) serve as arbitrators in strictly private international commercial disputes. They 
therefore carry the customs of ICA, which include the ‘justifiable doubts’ (or ‘reasonable apprehension’, 
as it is usually read) standard, in their briefcases when they cross over into ISA.”). 
 184 See also Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 13, 16 (1997) (exploring the 
connection between independence and impartiality, on the one side, and legitimacy in arbitration, on the 
other). 
 185 See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Order Concerning the 
Participation of a Counsel, ¶ 30 (May 6, 2008), which is very typical also concerning the standard of 
Article 14, but with the note that the case refers to the challenge of counsel:  
   The Tribunal [was] concerned – indeed, compelled – to preserve the integrity of the proceed-
ings and ultimately, its Award. Undoubtedly, one of the ‘fundamental rules of procedure’ re-
ferred to in Article 52 (1) (d) of the ICSID Convention is that the proceedings should not be 
tainted by any justifiable doubt as to the impartiality or independence of any Tribunal mem-
ber. The Parties agree that the relevant perspective in that inquiry is that of a reasonable in-
dependent observer. . .[The challenged counsel’s] continued participation in the proceedings 
could indeed lead a reasonable observer to form such a justifiable doubt in the present cir-
cumstance.  
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Arbitral independence in international investment arbitration is only 
partially a result of legal rules. It is rather more the effect of the process of 
the formation of the community of international arbitrators and its migra-
tion to international investment arbitration.186 Arbitral independence in in-
vestment law is a societal construct. 
Additionally, in the volatile and uncertain world of international 
law,187 international courts have had a hard time adapting to the changes of 
a globalized world. The more flexible nature of international arbitration tri-
bunals is probably one of the reasons that international investment arbitra-
tion has been so successful in recent years, especially in the late 1990s.188 
International investment tribunals operate as functional equivalents to 
courts in international law. For this reason, and under the guidance of the 
arbitration community, investor-State tribunals had to operate under similar 
independence standards as international courts, in order to achieve a high 
standard of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.189 
In the field of investment law, the construction of the independence 
standard for arbitrators is the result of a “process of communication”190 and 
interaction between the members of the international arbitration communi-
ty, states, international organizations, arbitration houses, and international 
courts. This makes it extremely volatile and subject to changes depending 
on the stage of development of the communication process. We have cur-
 
Id. 
 186 Cf. Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, The Social Construction of Law: The European Court of 
Justice and Its Legal Revolution Revisited, 7 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 417 (2011) (concerning the soci-
etal evolution of the European Union legal order, and the role of the Court of Justice of the EU). This 
goes back to an understanding of international law as (also) a process and not (only) as a condition; see 
Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Pub-
lic Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1959). See generally CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (2012) (re-interpreting international law as a socially constructed field). 
 187 Reisman, supra note 3, at 87–94. 
 188 See ICSID, supra note 9. 
 189 But see James Crawford & Joe McIntyre, The Independence and Impartiality of the “Interna-
tional Judiciary,” in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND 
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 189, 203 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012). According to 
James Crawford—one of the actors involved in the Mauritius v. United Kingdom—and Joe McIntyre: 
   There are no doubt analogous considerations concerning the exercise of an arbitral function, 
but there are also core differences in function. The increased role of party consent and the 
discrete and largely private character of the proceedings fundamentally affect not only the 
applicable standards, but the underlying objectives as well, particularly with regards to the 
diminished importance of public confidence. The judicial function imposes stricter consid-
erations of independence and impartiality than is demanded of arbitral functions.  
Id. 
 190 See Reisman, supra note 14. According to Reisman the legal process comprises three communi-
cative streams: policy content, authority signal, control intention. Id. at 113. See also McDougal & 
Lasswell, supra note 186, at 9 (defining legal process as the “making of authoritative and controlling 
decisions”).  
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rently reached a stage where a higher standard of review is starting to crys-
tallize in international investment arbitration, including ICSID arbitration. 
The next subsection describes the standard of review in ICSID arbitration 
and makes a proposal for a further differentiation in the standard of review 
in order to compromise current adjudication practice of the arbitration 
community with the textual interpretation of Article 57. 
 B. The Independence Standard(s) of International Investment 
Arbitrators: Status and Policy 
How many standards of review are there in investor-State arbitration? 
The provisional answer is that there are at least three: there is one in all ar-
bitration fora and two in the ICSID framework. Through the interplay of the 
arbitration community with other actors of the international community that 
are involved in the field, a unique ICSID standard has been constructed. In 
the following paragraphs, I will clarify some open issues on the standard of 
independence in international investment arbitration and propose some cor-
rections from a policy perspective: first, with regard to the chairpersons 
given their method of appointment and their special position in the arbitra-
tion process; second, concerning the recurring issue of the standard of re-
view in inter-State arbitration; and third, with regard to the “person” of the 
reasonable observer in investment arbitration. 
Arbitrators are only part-time adjudicators and part of their full-time 
job may be to write academic articles and notes on arbitration.191 Moreover, 
the interconnectedness of arbitrators, counsel, and businesspeople is una-
voidable in a globalized world.192 According to one arbitrator, “if arbitrators 
must be completely sanitized from all possible external influences on their 
decisions, only the most naïve or incompetent would be available.”193 
In contrast to domestic and in most cases also international courts, and 
similar to international commercial arbitration, the appointment process is 
what appears to be making the difference in international investment arbi-
tration and creating confusion with regard to the standard of independence 
 
 191 Urbaser S.A. & Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Camp-
bell MacLachlan, ¶ 46 (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0887.pdf (“[T]he mere fact of having made known an opinion on an issue relevant in an 
arbitration would have the effect of allowing a challenge for lack of independence or impartiality. Such 
a position, however, would have effects reaching far beyond what Claimants seem to sustain, and in-
compatible with the proper functioning of the arbitral system under the ICSID Convention.”). 
 192 Ahmed S. El-Kosheri & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of International Arbitrators: An 
Arbitrator’s Perspective, ICC INTL. COURT OF ARB. BULL., 2007 Special Supplement, ICC Pub. 690 
(2008), 48; see also Nathan, supra note 5, at 18 (“Although arbitral institutions make a fuss about the 
relationships with the parties, in practice none of them actually seriously review their relationships and 
take appropriate action except on a selective basis.”). 
 193 Park, supra note 5, at 635. 
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of investor-State arbitrators both in relevant case law and scholarship.194 
The coexistence of provisions for the independence and the appointment of 
arbitrators indeed creates an inherent tension in the provisions of the ICSID, 
and indeed any arbitration statute. 
In order to resolve the tension, we need to distinguish between ap-
pointment by the parties to the dispute, on the one side, and appointment by 
other agents, or appointment by consent of the parties or fellow arbitrators, 
on the other side. The fact that arbitrators are appointed either by the par-
ties, or by “appointing authorities” and consent, raises different questions 
concerning their independence.195 A noted arbitration scholar, Professor 
Catherine Rogers, for example, believes that according to the current sys-
tem of international investment arbitration, the party-appointed and the non-
party-appointed arbitrators are supposed to be different.196 Professor Yuval 
Shany contends that for party-appointed judges and arbitrators a consensu-
ally agreed deviation from the normal standard of judicial independence ap-
plies since the parties exchange expertise and influence for independence 
and impartiality in order to resort more often to adjudication.197 
This distinction between party-appointed and non-party-appointed ar-
bitrators places a great burden on the chairperson. In investor-State arbitra-
tion, the chairperson has an elevated role. This can be deduced from three 
types of special provisions. First, from the specific way in which they are 
appointed, namely by consent of the parties, the party-appointed arbitrators’ 
 
 194 Similar questions arise also in the ICJ with the “part-time,” and in other international courts with 
ad hoc, part-time, and ad litem judges. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tri-
bunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278 (2003) (“It would 
be unreasonable to expect that a nominating or appointing state would not put forward as a candidate a 
person who shares (in general terms) the value systems of the nominating state.”); id. at 283 (“Part-time 
and ad litem judges clearly cannot be subject to the same constraints on outside activities as full-time 
judges, which raises questions as to which activities are appropriate.”); see generally Yuval Shany, 
Squaring the Circle? Independence and Impartiality of Party-Appointed Adjudicators in International 
Legal Proceedings, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473 (2008) (arguing that it is a mistake to ap-
ply the same test for judicial independence and impartiality that applies to permanent domestic and in-
ternational judges, and non-party-appointed arbitrators to party-appointed judges and arbitrators); but 
see the Preamble of the Burgh House Principles, supra note 18; Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 120 
(criticizing as anachronistic the provisions dealing with the appointment of judges bearing the nationali-
ty of litigant states, with particular deference to Article 31 of the ICJ Statute and Article 27(2) of the 
ECHR statute).  
 195 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., supra note 5, at 1; cf. also Erik Voeten, The Politics of Interna-
tional Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 403 (2009) (“The precise institutional mechanisms 
that govern the appointment and retention process greatly influence the ability of governments to affect 
judicial behavior.”). 
 196 Rogers, supra note 87, at 246 (“They [party-appointed arbitrators] represent one party’s prefer-
ence for a decision-maker and are selected based on a careful assessment. If party-appointed arbitrators 
were, with any degree of regularity, writing dissenting opinions in favor of an opposing party, it would 
mean that parties were doing an exceptionally poor job of identifying party-appointed arbitrators.”) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 197 Shany, supra note 194, passim. 
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consent, or by a neutral organization. Second, the chairperson’s elevated 
role is reflected in different provisions concerning the nationality of arbitra-
tors. In investment arbitration, Article 9(5) International Chamber of Com-
merce Rules, which specifies the special requirement that the sole arbitrator 
or the chairperson of the arbitral tribunal shall be of a nationality other than 
those of the parties, has a special role given that states and foreign nationals 
are involved in the dispute. Third, the special position of the chairpersons 
can also be deduced directly from the special powers they have in the arbi-
tration process.198 For example, pursuant to Article 58 of the ICSID Con-
vention, in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole arbitrator, or a majori-
ty of arbitrators, the chairperson shall take this decision.199 
For these reasons, the common independence standard should apply to 
chairpersons independent of the arbitration forum. I propose that for all the 
arbitral fora the common standard should apply. Based on what has been 
described above, I then propose two standards for international investment 
arbitrators operating under the ICSID framework: one for the chairperson, 
and one for the party-appointed arbitrators. For the chairperson of the arbi-
tral tribunal, the common test that applies across investment arbitration, and 
arbitration generally, should apply: 
• Standard: “justifiable doubts” – “appearance of bias” 
• Intensity: mere possibility of bias 
• Point of view: “reasonable observer/third party” (objective) 
For the party-appointed arbitrators, the test as developed by recent 
ICSID case law should apply: 
• Standard: “justifiable doubts” – “appearance of bias” 
• Intensity: “manifest lack” of bias (high probability of bias)200 
• Point of view: “reasonable observer/third party” (objective) 
In order to illustrate the differences, the non-corrected ICSID standard 
 
 198 See, e.g., PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 33(2) (“In the case of questions of pro-
cedure, when there is no majority or when the arbitral tribunal so authorizes, the presiding arbitrator may 
decide alone, subject to revision, if any, by the arbitral tribunal.”). 
 199 See also ICSID Regulations and Rules, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceed-
ings, Rule 9(4); Piero Bernardini, ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER 
AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 159 (David Arias & Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros eds., 
2010). 
 200 The intensity standard of “high probability” of dependence and partiality is to be deduced from a 
systematic interpretation of the highly raised bar of the burden of proof as set out in Articles 14 and 57 
and from ICSID case law. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. &Vivendi Universal 
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualifi-
cation of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶ 29 (Oct. 22, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0811_0.pdf (citing Amco Asia Corp. v. In-
donesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (unpublished, 
reported June 24, 1982); Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8 
ICSID Rep. 398 (2005)). 
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for both the chairperson and the party-appointed arbitrators would have 
been the following: 
• Standard: “manifest lack” 
• Intensity: high probability of bias based on facts 
• Point of view: unclear, but probably “reasonable observer/third 
party” (objective) 
At the same time, accepting a lower standard of independence for par-
ty-appointed arbitrators might create perverse incentives for them, and give 
the wrong signals to the parties as to the level of their independence. How is 
this problem to be solved? From a policy-perspective, the need to respect 
the decisions of the parties and the need to provide for justice in interna-
tional arbitration can be resolved with recourse to the standard of review. 
As a basis for the assessment, the deciding authorities could use the relevant 
case law concerning the self-judging clauses.201 The International Court of 
Justice, the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, and some invest-
ment tribunals apply a separate standard of review with regard to the self-
judging exception clauses. They apply a good faith review, instead of a full 
substantive review of whether a measure meets the requirements of an ex-
ception clause. One could apply this solution to the assessment of arbitral 
independence. The difference between the two standards is one of the bur-
den of proof on the side of the challenging party202 and of the disqualifica-
tion standard of review on the decision of the deciding authority. The chal-
lenging party has to pass a higher bar in order to prove dependence or 
partiality of the party-appointed arbitrator, in comparison to the chairperson 
of the tribunal; the deciding authority, either the unchallenged arbitrators or 
the Chairperson of the Administrative Council of ICSID, should apply a 
good faith review in the case of the party-appointed arbitrators rather than a 
full substantive review in the case of the chairperson. 
The question of differentiated standards of review exists both in do-
mestic and international law. The standard of review determines how far an 
authority can go in reconsidering another authority’s decision. In the United 
States, for example, a standard of review is usually the measure of defer-
ence an appellate court gives to the rulings of a lower court.203 Very com-
mon standards of review are “clear error,” which is used when the appellate 
court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact, “de novo review,” used when 
reviewing questions of law, and “abuse of discretion,” used when reviewing 
decisions that are left to the discretion of trial courts.204 The intensity of re-
 
 201 See generally Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in 
International Dispute Settlement, in 13 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 61 (Armin 
von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2009).  
 202 See Part II.C.3.b. and cases cited supra note 200.  
 203 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of American-Style Judicial Review, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010). 
 204 Id. 
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view can be understood as a continuum with clear error at the one end of 
the spectrum and de novo review at the other. Clear error is highly deferen-
tial, and abuse of discretion is deferential, while de novo review is non-
deferential. In international law, different standards of review appear in how 
far international courts and tribunals can go when reconsidering a domestic 
authority’s decision.205 Also in international economic law, and internation-
al investment law more specifically, the standard of review plays an ex-
tremely important role as to the degree of deference on the side of the in-
vestment tribunals towards decisions of domestic authorities, and the 
regulatory discretion of domestic authorities.206 Similarly, the need to re-
spect the decisions of the parties that have selected the specific composition 
of an arbitral tribunal and the need to provide for justice in international in-
vestment arbitration can be addressed by the standard of review. In the 
above described continuum, full substantive review comes closer to de novo 
review, while good faith review comes closer to clear error. 
Three principles have also to be borne in mind in this respect: the prin-
ciple de minimis non curat lex should find application here,207 and the abso-
lute limits of every system of adjudication, namely the principles audi al-
teram partem and nemo judex in causa sua.208 Procedural safeguards 
generally should be respected. In any case of a clear violation of disclosure 
rules, the arbitrator should be considered to be biased and as a result be dis-
qualified.209 
The same should also apply in inter-State arbitration. As we have seen, 
the courts and tribunals largely apply the same standard of independence for 
their adjudicators. In Mauritius v. U.K. we saw the Tribunal, composed of a 
majority of international judges, declare a differentiated standard of inde-
pendence in the case of inter-State conflicts,210 including cases before courts 
 
 205 See generally DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014).   
 206 See, e.g., Schill, supra note 89; see generally Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protec-
tion and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in 
Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 197 (2013); Valentina Vadi & Lukasz 
Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Investment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Gov-
ernance and the Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013). 
 207 See Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 462.  
 208 See Giacinto della Cananea, Due Process for Foreign Investors: Trans-national Standards of Pro-
cedural Fairness (draft, on file with the author); Buechel, supra note 5, at 243 (“Arbitrators are often 
closely involved in the market that appoints them, which arise the issues of them being partial, biased, 
pre-disposed and being interested in the outcome of arbitration. The long-standing norms that no one 
should be a judge in his own cause and that justice should be seen to be done apply equally to interna-
tional arbitration.”); see also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 
462. 
 209 See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 111–12. 
 210 See also Meron, supra note 58, at 368; but see Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 128–29; 
Seibert-Fohr, supra note 148, at 771 (for a critique of the relevant practice).  
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and arbitral tribunals, in comparison to private-State, or private-private con-
flicts. The higher disqualification standard of review as described in the 
previous paragraphs should apply also for the chairperson in inter-State in-
vestment cases. 
For both tests, there has to be a further adaptation to investor-State ar-
bitration requirements. The special character of investment law and arbitra-
tion speaks for a specific interpretation of the “reasonable observer,” or 
“third party.” Given the public character of international investment arbitra-
tion, there is a need to define the third party in a different way than in other 
fields of arbitration. A large part of the imaginary observer should be con-
stituted from the population of the host country.211 Through this clause, the 
law and practice of international investment arbitration can respond to the 
global and domestic public interest.212 A step in this direction is to be found 
in the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration.”213 They specify in Article 1(4)(a) that where the arbitral tribu-
nal is exercising a discretion to decide on the transparency of the proceed-
ings, the tribunal should take into account both the public interest in trans-
parency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration and the disputing parties’ 
interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute. 
 IV. CONTROL MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
As a response to dissatisfaction among some participants and observ-
ers with the overall structure of the investor-State arbitration system and the 
results it produces,214 several proposals have been suggested as alternatives 
to the current system.215 Some of these proposals include a fundamental re-
shaping of the current system, while others propose the introduction of con-
trol systems. Five major proposals will be presented briefly here: (1) the 
abolishment of party-appointed arbitrators; (2) the introduction of an appeal 
mechanism; (3) the establishment of an international investment court; (4) 
 
 211 Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 165 (with reference to ,EDF International S.A. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kauf-
mann-Kohler, ¶ 74 (June 25, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0262.pdf) (“Focusing primarily on the parties to the dispute, the Orange List disregards a 
key stakeholder in the investment arbitration process: the host state’s populace. Otherwise stated, who is 
the “reasonable observer” against whose views the arbitrator’s apparent independence is to be meas-
ured?”); see also id. at 171–75. 
 212 Cf. also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 475. 
 213 The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration are effective 
from April 1, 2014. 
 214 See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 19. 
 215 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see generally THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS (Jose E. Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant, Kamil 
Girard Ahmed & Gabriela P. Vizcaino eds., 2011). 
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the introduction of binding codes of conduct; and (5) the resort to the old 
means of diplomacy and dispute resolution through domestic courts. With 
the exception of the fourth proposal, the proposed reforms go either in the 
direction of a further judicialization of investment arbitration, or returning 
to the old status quo with the hope that this time it will work. 
After discussing these proposals, I will then put forward my sugges-
tion for the improvement of the current system so that arbitration remains 
an effective alternative to the courts. A system of market-based regulation 
focusing on the arbitration community and the person of the arbitrator could 
be a solution to the balancing of independence and control beyond any ma-
jor institutional reform. 
 A. The Need for Accountability Mechanisms 
As in the field of international courts, the increasing judicialization 
and independence moves of the international investment tribunals leads to 
an increased need for accountability216 or control mechanisms:217 
“To say that judges should be independent, that they should base their 
decisions on the facts of individual cases rather than in response to outside 
pressure is one thing. But to say that courts in general should not be held 
accountable by the public and by the other branches is to ask for a protec-
tion no democratic society should grant.”218 
The same applies to international investment arbitration.219 
Controls over decisions are a prerequisite for international third party 
decision-making.220 If the control and accountability mechanisms of the ad-
 
 216 See generally Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, 7 
L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 313 (2008); Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Promote the Inde-
pendence and Accountability of International Tribunals, 2 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 27 
(2003); Ronli Sifris, Weighing Judicial Independence against Judicial Accountability: Do the Scales of 
the International Criminal Court Balance?, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 88 (2008). 
 217 See sources cited supra note 21; see also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Design-
ing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 141 (2001). 
 218 Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors Affecting Judicial Independence, JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 148, 150 (Stephen B. Bur-
bank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). 
 219 REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 21, at 1 (“Arbitration is a delegated and restricted 
power to make certain types of decisions in certain prescribed ways. Any restricted delegation of power 
must have some system of control. Controls are techniques or mechanisms in engineered artifacts, 
whether physical or social, whose function is to ensure that an artifact works the way it was designed to 
work. In social and legal arrangements in which a limited power is delegated, control systems are essen-
tial; without them the putative restrictions disappear and the limited power may become absolute . . . . 
Nor should controls be conceived in a negative sense. Controls are necessary not only for efficient oper-
ation. Effective controls are the only assurance of limited government. In this sense controls are a sine 
qua non of liberty.”). 
 220 Id. at 2. 
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judication bodies fail, then many actors may refrain from using the sys-
tem.221 This might explain why states resort less often than expected to in-
ternational courts. For this reason, controls in international adjudication and 
arbitration are not only conditions for the efficient functioning of the sys-
tem, but “conditions of operation.”222 In the same way as appearance of bias 
operates with regard to judicial independence, at least an “appearance of ac-
countability” has to be present in international arbitration. Mechanisms 
need to be developed that will bring an equilibrium between independence, 
control and accountability. These new mechanisms will attract more actors 
that until now have chosen not to participate in the system, such as Brazil, 
into investment arbitration, and they will reverse the recent trend of aban-
doning investment arbitration. 
The new system should achieve a new “degree of independence”,223 or 
what Professors Helfer and Slaughter call “constrained independence”.224 
The difficult part of the institutional design for international arbitration is 
that constrained independence has to be achieved in a market-context, on 
the one side, and in a field of increased political sensitivity and significant 
economic importance, on the other. In the words of Yuval Shany, referring 
generally to international adjudication: 
The focus of our attention should therefore shift from discussing the 
existence and desirability of an ‘ideal type’ of judicial independ-
ence—a discussion premised on a monolithic understating of the in-
ternational judicial function, to a study of the nuts and bolts of the 
constraints put on international courts in the unique institutional and 
normative environments in which they operate.225 
A further judicialization step in the field of international investment 
arbitration might undermine the existence of the field itself.226 Even if this 
might not be a negative evolution as such, it might undermine the invest-
ment regime as a whole, and thus have detrimental effects on countries in 
need of capital inflows from foreign investors. Moreover, with the rise of 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN 
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin Stotzky ed., 1993); see also Owen M. Fiss, Judicial 
Independence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Leonard Levy and Kenneth Karst 
eds., 2nd ed.  2000) (both on the idea of the “degree of independence” of judges). 
 224 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 58, at 44–56; Shany, supra note 2, at 261–67; see generally Tom 
Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631 (2005) (dis-
cussing “bounded discretion”); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 A.J.I.L. 247 (elucidating the concept of “strategic space”).   
 225 Shany, supra note 2, at 262–63. 
 226 See Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 
2003, at 37, 38 (2003); Park, supra note 5, at 693–94. 
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the BRICS and other (former) developing countries, developed countries 
could also benefit from capital inflows. In addition, even if the system does 
not collapse, it is not certain that the next step in its development will nec-
essarily be positive. Investors may either resort to domestic courts, or other 
means of alternative dispute resolution.227 The success of the first possible 
exit from the system is dependent on the quality of the domestic courts. The 
second possible exit might lead to opposite results from that which even the 
proponents of the public law judicialization of investment arbitration would 
want; namely to less juridified and judicialized dispute resolution by means 
of conciliation or mediation. This has happened in other fields, and in do-
mestic law, and may also happen in investment arbitration. So, more (law) 
could mean less (law). Moreover, according to Stavros Brekoulakis, if some 
of the proposals such as the abolishment of party-appointment or the estab-
lishment of a standing international investment court are adopted, there is a 
great danger that the “pluralistic, diverse and democratic potential of inter-
national arbitration” will be undermined.228 Given the current structure of 
the system, reforms in arbitration would rather need to enhance ideological 
pluralism and prevent homogeneity.229 
 B. Alternatives to the Current System 
Recently, there have been proposals by very eminent and highly influ-
ential arbitration practitioners and scholars proposing the reform of inves-
tor-State dispute resolution.230 Similar proposals have also been formulated 
by international organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD).231 The different proposals range from in-
creasing transparency of the investor-arbitration system232 to introducing 
new institutional mechanisms like a system of preliminary rulings in inter-
 
 227 See also Henckels, supra note 206, at 199 (2013) (“If adjudicators employ overly strict standards 
of review, this may give rise to compliance issues, reform of relevant legal instruments to curtail adjudi-
cative discretion, or withdrawal of states from the court or tribunal’s jurisdiction—all of which are situa-
tions that have arisen in international investment law.”). 
 228 Brekoulakis, supra note 5, at 557. 
 229 Id. at 582. As examples of this kind Professor Brekoulakis mentions the increase of the number 
of arbitrators sitting in a case from one or three to five, the enlargement of the pool and cultural diversity 
of potential arbitrators and capacity-building programs.  
 230 See generally Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the 
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 885 (2007). 
 231 See UNCTAD, supra note 20. 
 232 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. G.A. Res. 68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013); Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency, opened for signature Mar. 17, 2015, 54 I.L.M. 747, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-
E.pdf. 
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national investment arbitration.233 This subsection discusses some of these 
proposals. 
 1. Abolishment of Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
For reasons that become clear after an analysis of the (lack of) institu-
tional guarantees in international investment arbitration in contrast to inter-
national courts, prominent international arbitration practitioners and schol-
ars like Jan Paulsson and Jan van den Berg have proposed the abolishment 
of the system of party-appointment in international investment arbitra-
tion.234 It has been suggested instead that all members of an arbitral tribunal 
should be appointed by arbitral institutions. The institutional selection of 
arbitrators would allow for more transparency in the appointing process and 
better control of the quality of the appointed arbitrators. 
Despite the possible merits of this system with regard to enhanced in-
stitutional independence, the adoption of this proposal would mean that the 
international investment system would lose many of its positive aspects. 
The tribunals would lose the ability to glean major insights into the facts of 
each case and the specificities of each individual party that can be provided 
by party-appointed arbitrators. Losing the power to appoint an arbitrator, 
the actors may moreover stop resorting to arbitration overall. 
 2. Appeal Mechanism 
One of the most popular ideas put forward for reform is to introduce a 
second instance or appellate body, like the WTO Appellate Body.235 An ap-
 
 233 See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, Preliminary Rulings in Investment Arbitration, in APPEALS 
MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 207 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008). 
 234 Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Ar-
bitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL 
REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011); see generally Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in 
International Dispute Resolution: Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished 
Scholar Chair Before the University of Miami Law School, in 25 ICSID INVESTMENT L.J. 339 (2010); 
Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 33 
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_33.pdf ; but see Charles N. Brower & 
Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Pre-
sumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(2012), 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/Charles_Brower_The_Death_of_the_Two
-Headed_Nightingale_Speech_2.pdf ; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is the Party Appointed Arbitrator a “Perni-
cious Institution”? A Reply to Professor Hans Smit, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 35 (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_35.pdf. See also Trakman, supra note 92, at 660 (on the in-
troduction of standing panels). 
 235 APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2008); 
Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179 (2005); 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME, in 
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peal mechanism has the advantage of keeping the basic structure of the sys-
tem untouched, while introducing an additional review layer in order to in-
crease consistency in awards. Another major advantage of this proposal is 
that it could help investment arbitration develop in a more transparent way, 
given that, one way or another, annulment has in practice started playing the 
role of appeal with the ICSID ad hoc committees interpreting the annulment 
grounds very expansively. 
This institutional development might be a necessary step in ICSID ar-
bitration, given that it is the arbitration system where controls, international 
or domestic, are least effective. An appeal mechanism, though, will not cre-
ate the necessary incentives for further improvements in the direction of en-
couraging new arbitrators to enter the market. An appellate stage might also 
increase the costs and time involved for the resolution of investment dis-
putes.236 
 3. Standing International Investment Court 
The proposal involving the most rigorous reshaping of dispute resolu-
tion in the international investment regime has been put forward by Profes-
sor Gus Van Harten.237 Van Harten proposes to replace investment arbitra-
tion with a permanent international investment court with tenured judges 
subject to the supervision of national courts or an appellate body, because 
private arbitrators are allegedly not in the position to resolve public law is-
 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, 
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 479 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); Da-
vid A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: 
Prospects and Challenges, 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 39, 43–44 (2006); Christian J. Tams, An Appealing 
Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure, ESSAYS TRANSNAT’L ECON. L., June 2006, at 
57; see also Trakman, supra note 92, at 662 (“Seventeenth, the ICSID needs an appellate body with ju-
risdiction beyond annulment proceedings, including expanded grounds of appeal and remedies. Such an 
appellate body can also help render ICSID jurisprudence more consistent.”); Bottini, supra note 5, at 
365–66. The European Commission is also currently working on this idea. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
FACT SHEET: INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU 
AGREEMENTS 9 (Nov. 23, 2013). See generally Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in International 
Dispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43 (2008).  
 236 UNCTAD, supra note 20, at 8. 
 237 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 29, at 180–84; Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International In-
vestment Court (June 30, 2008), Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 
2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424 [hereinafter Van Harten, International Investment Court]; Van 
Harten, supra note 88, at 627; Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE 
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 175–84 (Michael Waibel et al. eds, 2010); see also 
Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitu-
tionalization?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 135, 118–
36 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Andreas Bucher, Is there a Need to Establish a Permanent 
Review Body?, 6 REV. INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 285 (2010). 
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sues.238 This goes together with an understanding that international courts 
are the best adjudication fora for international disputes. The tenure of judg-
es of a permanent court would lead to an increase in the independence and 
impartiality of the adjudicators since tenured judges would not have any po-
tential future appointments in mind as arguably arbitrators do. 
This proposal speaks for a complete departure from the current system 
and is worth consideration by any person interested in the values of adjudi-
cator independence and accountability. The users of arbitration, including 
developing and developed states and investors would then have to decide 
whether they prefer the virtues of arbitration despite its vices. In view of the 
general global trend to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) instead of 
courts, appointing tenured judges cannot be viewed as a viable solution. 
Given that both states and investors will always have exit options through 
recourse to the traditional international law dispute resolution mechanisms, 
we might end up with a court similar to the ICJ. 
 4. Codes of Conduct 
Given the current partial collapse of control systems in international 
arbitration, the European Commission has also put forward its own proposal 
for reform of international investment arbitration, or “investor-state dispute 
settlement” (ISDS).239 The European Union is the largest economy in the 
world and the Lisbon Treaty of 2008 made negotiating investment agree-
ments an EU competence.240 It is expected that changes in the EU systems 
of control will have a systemic impact on international investment arbitra-
tion overall. 
The European Commission proposes changes to improve both invest-
ment protection rules and dispute settlement.241 Major concerns with regard 
to dispute settlement are “conflicts of interests” and “consistency of arbitral 
awards.”242 The EU has drafted a code of conduct with specific obligations 
for arbitrators which is supposed to be introduced in future trade and in-
vestment agreements of the EU with its partners.243 The code already forms 
part of the negotiated agreement of the EU with Canada. According to Eu-
ropean Commission reports, as the code has not yet been made public, it in-
cludes provisions on conflicts of interests and broader questions on the eth-
 
 238 Van Harten, International Investment Court, supra note 237. 
 239 EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 235. 
 240 See Regulation 1219/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between Member States 
and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351/40) 
 241 EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 235, 7. 
 242 Id. at 9. 
 243 Cf. also Rogers, supra note 22, 110–12 (on the adoption of codes of conduct for international 
arbitrators). 
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ics and conduct of arbitrators.244 
This effort to regulate the conduct of arbitrators is accompanied by the 
introduction of a list of individuals who can act as arbitrators in a particular 
dispute, an approach also found in the ICSID Convention. This “list ap-
proach” has the major difference in the case of the EU-Canada free trade 
agreement (CETA) in comparison to the ICSID in that the individuals on 
the list will have to be chosen by both the EU and Canada on the basis of 
expertise, and there will be an obligation for them to comply with the code 
of conduct. 
The system proposed by the EU includes very interesting elements for 
the future regulation of international investment arbitration because it ad-
dresses the arbitration community as such. I believe that this mode of arbi-
trator regulation could develop within a system of co-regulation, as will be 
described later in the text, which would be greeted with much more ac-
ceptance by the arbitration community. 
 5. Going Back: Diplomacy and Domestic Courts 
Currently, there are even some proposals to go back to the traditional 
means of solving international disputes. In every international dispute in-
volving foreign nationals, the traditional way of resolving investor-State 
disputes has been diplomacy.245 Some current proposals include a return to 
diplomatic protection in international investment law.246 Moreover, diplo-
macy has recently made a come-back with a more modern face. UNCTAD, 
for example, has elaborated a toolkit for dispute resolution using the means 
of classical international law—negotiation, conciliation and mediation or 
other managed conflict prevention measures like good offices and en-
quiry—in a more structured way within the BITs.247 
These measures may end up being ineffective by causing delays to 
dispute resolution instead of offering solutions.248 The measures are more 
geared towards dispute prevention and avoidance rather than dispute resolu-
tion. Even though it is preferable for states to resolve their disputes in a 
 
 244 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT (CETA) 3 (Sept. 26, 2014); Regulation 1219/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351/40) 9. 
 245 See O. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of 
Modern International Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 649–92 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 
2010–2011).  
 246 M. Sornarajah, Starting Anew in International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 74 (July 
16, 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_74.pdf. 
 247 UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010); see also Trakman, supra 
note 92, at 657–59. 
 248 Trackman, supra note 92, at 658 (citing Colin Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal 
Cultural Insights, in REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27 (Leon Trakman & Nick 
Ranieri eds. 2013)). 
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friendly way, there is no assurance that they will not resort to litigation.249 
Moreover, the tripartite quasi-judicial structure of investor-State arbitration 
may then be restructured into two politicized bipartite ones. The investors, 
who had in the beginning to deal only with the foreign bureaucracy, would 
then have to deal with the bureaucracy of their country of origin too. As a 
result, the introduction of these measures can cut both ways.250 
A further proposal, partly in response to the withdrawal of Australia 
from international investment arbitration, has been recently again put on the 
table to go back to the system of domestic courts deciding on investor-State 
issues.251 The basic argument in favor of domestic courts is that foreign and 
domestic investors should be granted the same treatment.252 But, if we view 
investment law as an international regime and “if domestic courts have the 
final word on state-investment arbitration, domestic laws and interests are 
likely to further dilute international investment law and practice.”253 Even-
tually, the success of a broad re-introduction of domestic courts in the reso-
lution of international investment disputes will be highly dependent on the 
quality of domestic courts.254 
 C. Adaptation to the Constructed Standards 
 1. Co-regulation 
The reform proposals that have been described above are suggestions 
for an institutional reshaping of international investment arbitration; each 
one of a different degree of intensity. Consistent with the analysis on the 
construction of arbitral independence, the best way to improve the overall 
system is by focusing on the arbitration community, the arbitrators, and 
 
 249 See Mark Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 199–222 (Todd Weiler & Freya 
Baetens eds., 2011). 
 250 See Trakman, supra note 92, at 659. 
At their best, these dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms may discourage parties from resorting 
to fractious, costly, and disruptive arbitration or litigation. At their worst, however, they may protract 
investor-state conflict, delay dispute resolution, and increase its costs. Institutionalized dispute resolu-
tion options that are incorporated into bilateral investment treaties may avert litigation or arbitration, or 
they may simply delay it. Conciliation may fail because one party objects to the appointment of a facili-
tator; or, on appointment, that facilitator may fail to secure investor-state cooperation in managing a 
conflict, such as one party declining to allow consultation with non-governmental agencies.  
Id. 
 251 See Leon E. Trakman, Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New 
Trend?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 83 (2012); Leon E. Trakman, Foreign Direct Investment: An Australian 
Perspective, 13 INT’L TRADE & BUS L. REV. 31, 48–53 (2010); Trakman, supra note 92, at 648–57. 
 252 David Schneiderman, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES 
AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 59 (2008). 
 253 Trakman, supra note 92, at 605. 
 254 Cf. also id. at 652. 
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their qualities rather than on any major institutional reform. A solution can-
not include fundamental changes to the legal and institutional framework if 
it is to be at all viable and accepted by all players in the field. The proposal 
put forward in this Article is to regulate investor-State arbitration; yet, in a 
completely different way than the alternatives proposed so far. The system 
proposed here shifts the focus from the institutions to the arbitration com-
munity and the person of the arbitrator.255 
In order to draw ideas on how to regulate arbitrators, one could look at 
the toolkit of theories of regulation. The good news is that scholars working 
in other fields of ADR like mediation have already worked out solutions 
and can provide some guidance in this effort. As for the person of the arbi-
trator, similar to mediators, there are four possible ways to regulate them 
based on a different degree of intensity of the regulatory intervention:256 (a) 
a license system as with the liberal professions; (b) a system of recognition 
of pre-existent private systems as in the Austrian Zivilrechts-Mediations-
Gesetz (ZivMediatG);257 (c) a quality mark system; or (d) no regulation 
such as is the current system for international commercial and investment 
arbitration. 
Looking at the different systems, one should try to think of ways to 
make the appointment of arbitrators more objective, keeping in mind at the 
same time the need for the market to define some of the features of arbitra-
tion. The appropriate institutional design would be best chosen based on the 
existing characteristics of the investor-State arbitration system, namely the 
existence of an arbitration community, the lack of organizational guarantees 
of independence, and the operation of the arbitrators in a market for arbitra-
tors. The market should bring its own accountability mechanisms to interna-
tional investment arbitration. 
My proposal is to respect both the basic structure of international in-
vestment arbitration and the propensity of the arbitration community to-
wards self-regulation258 and introduce a system adapted to these conditions. 
I propose, combining systems (b) and (c) that were presented in the previ-
ous paragraph through the introduction of a certification system in the field 
 
 255 See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 121 (calling on arbitral institutions to “engage in more active, 
rigorous, and transparent . . . oversight of arbitrator conduct.”). 
 256 See Gerhard Wagner, Grundstrukturen eines deutschen Mediationsgesetzes [The Basic Structure 
of a German Mediation Act], 74 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 794, 825 (2010). 
 257 Bundesgesetz über Mediation in Zivilrechtssachen [Federal Act on Mediation in Civil Matters], 
June 6, 2003, BGBL I at 123, no. 29 (Ger.). 
 258 See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 154, at 47 (“The system of selection and self-regulation of arbi-
trators created by the pioneers and resembling a ‘club’ is still quite essential to the prosperity of interna-
tional commercial arbitration. Despite the conflicts and differing positions taken with respect to the con-
duct of arbitration, the participants in the debates are still in key respects members of a common 
community.”). 
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of international investment arbitration.259 The arbitration market has already 
created such a system in other fields, like commercial arbitration, and medi-
ation has a relatively advanced global market-based quality assessment sys-
tem. 
This system could help improve openness and transparency of the 
market by allowing more certified arbitrators to become eligible for selec-
tion. It would also cope with the problem of lack of information and infor-
mation asymmetries in the arbitration market,260 without simultaneously 
creating a bureaucratic institution for its management.261 As an institutional 
guarantee for the quality of certifications, ICSID could perform the role of 
the manager of the system. This method of governance is usually called 
“co-regulation” or “collaborative governance” in the theory of regulation.262 
The “List” system currently provided for in the ICSID Convention could 
evolve into a certification system.263 
 
 259 This proposal is based on a similar evolution observed in the field of product safety, where certi-
fication and accreditation developed in the market as market instruments and the system has then been 
adopted by the WTO TBT Agreement and the European Union. At the international level, the Kyoto 
Protocol also uses a similar system in order to measure emission reductions by private certification bod-
ies. See GEORGIOS DIMITROPOULOS, ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND AKKREDITIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN 
VERWALTUNGSVERBUND (2012); see also Rogers, supra note 22, at 121 (with further references) (“Fi-
nally, as some have already suggested for the domestic context, perhaps the time has come for licensing 
or certification procedures to regulate arbitrator conduct. These steps are inevitable as the pool of inter-
national arbitrators transforms from being an ad hoc collection of highly talented independent contrac-
tors into a fully formed profession.”). 
 260 ROGERS, supra note 26, at 338–39.  
 261 Catherine Rogers proposes the establishment of a new “Arbitrator Intelligence” (AI) as a private 
regulator that will create an information resource about arbitrators. Id. at 340–42. 
 262 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (1997–1998); Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of Governance, 2009 J. DISP. RES. 411 
(2009). 
 263 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 57, at 21 (describing the pros and cons of the “list system”): 
   This forces states to incur the additional cost of establishing new rules for each dispute and 
creates unpredictability. Some international tribunals reflect an effort to solve this problem 
without adopting all of the features of true courts. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), for example, was, in essence, a pool of arbitrators-in waiting. In theory, the PCA, by 
providing a ready pool of arbitrators, made arbitration more attractive. But while the pool re-
duces the transaction costs of finding a generally able and reputable arbitrator, the states do 
not necessarily have a guarantee that any particular arbitrator will be able or willing to max-
imize the ex ante value of the agreement between them. The transaction costs of finding an 
arbitrator are a relatively small deterrent compared with the risk of selecting a biased or in-
competent one. And because each dispute involves a unique combination of interests, facts, 
and treaty provisions, expertise cannot be generalized. Confidence can come only as the par-
ties repeatedly and successfully use a particular arbitrator or the pool. But why should the 
states repeatedly take this risk rather than rely on their own information to select an arbitra-
tor? This reluctance to “enter the pool” prevents resources such as the PCA from being suc-
cessful. A coherent jurisprudence can only arise when states are required to use the same 
body for dispute resolution. 
Id. See also Rogers, The Politics, supra note 87, at 253 (mentioning the partial failure of the List of Ar-
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 2. Certification in Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Systems of “certification” and “accreditation” in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution are quality assurance mechanisms of a person’s competence.264 
The system of certification is used primarily in mediation.265 There are na-
tional and international attempts to regulate certification of mediators.266 
The general tendency of the different systems is to “license” training/
certification organizations, which on their part conduct training sessions 
and certify mediators. The licensing bodies may be public or private institu-
tions.  The training/certification providers may be public, private, or aca-
demic bodies—like Colorado State, Harvard, Northwestern, and Pepperdine 
Universities in the United States. The international and domestic systems 
usually sustain public registers of certified mediators in order to make me-
diation activities more transparent. 
International attempts to regulate mediation might be interesting for 
our purposes. The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) and the 
International Mediation Institute (IMI) are two of the most famous attempts 
by private global organizations to regulate the field. 
CEDR, a London-based private mediation body, offers mediation 
training courses internationally.267 The trainers may be lawyers, account-
ants, business professionals, HR professionals, architects, teachers or even 
public sector officials. Candidates are eligible to be awarded a “Certificate 
of Accreditation” or CEDR Accreditation and thus become “CEDR Accred-
 
bitrators system given that despite having urged by ICSID, less half of the parties to the ICSID Conven-
tion and very few from among the developing countries have made use of the right to make nominations 
to the List). 
 264 The notions “certification” and “accreditation” in ADR are usually used interchangeably catering 
for some obscurity in the systems used. The proposal elaborated in this Article uses “certification” and 
“accreditation” for different functions in the system. 
 265 Only in rare occasions are certification schemes to be found in other ADR fields like arbitra-
tion—for arbitration, there are a few schemes in the US, and South Africa is also preparing one. See Ju-
dith Meyer, Mediators’ Alert: Now, Certification Goes Global, 26 ALTERNATIVES 57, 65 (2008) (citing 
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935). 
 266 See Kelly Austin et al., Mediator Certification: What Are the Practitioners Afraid of?, 26 
ALTERNATIVES 188 (2008); Conrad C. Daly, Accreditation: Mediation’s Path to Professionalism, 4 AM. 
J. MEDIATION 39 (2010); W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy 
the Growing Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 95 (1995); Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification 
Programs, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (1999); David A. Hoffman, Certifying ADR Providers, 40 APR 
BOST. B.J. 9 (1996); Donald T. Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 
757 (1996); Meyer, supra note 265; Tony Willis, Mediator Accreditation: Is It a Risk? Or Quality En-
hancement?, 26 ALTERNATIVES 165 (2008); Mandy Zhang, To Certify, or Not to Certify: A Comparison 
of Australia and the U.S. in Achieving National Mediator Certification, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 307 
(2008).  
 267 Negotiation and Leadership Academy, CEDR, http://www.cedr.com/skills/certificate/ (last visit-
ed Jan. 30, 2015). 
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ited Mediators” after training, which includes mock disputes and a three-
part written assignment, while the “Foundation Course in Mediation Skills 
Certificate” is given to acknowledge the participation to those who do not 
achieve accreditation. According to CEDR, this program seeks to develop 
relationship, process, and content skills.268 
Corporate users of mediation, organized under the auspices of the In-
ternational Mediation Institute (IMI), have also created a further initiative to 
certify mediators.269 IMI is a nonprofit public-interest foundation estab-
lished in The Hague and is a joint initiative of the American Arbitration As-
sociation, the Netherlands Mediation Institute and the Singapore Mediation 
Centre/Singapore International Arbitration Centre. In order to become an 
IMI Certified Mediator, the candidate must first be qualified for IMI Certi-
fication by a Qualifying Assessment Program (QAP) that has been ap-
proved by an IMI Independent Standards Commission (ISC).270 
 3. The Proposed System 
The idea to certify mediators did not arise from the governments; it 
originated in the market and has been taken up by public and private regula-
tors. I propose a similar system for international investment law to the one 
described above. As for the mediators, the system would not be established 
as a license system, and certification would not be an obligatory require-
ment to practice as an investor-State arbitrator. Rather, an opt-in voluntary 
system is envisaged, where nobody would be obliged to apply for certifica-
tion. The objective is not to close, but to open access to a larger pool of ar-
bitrators for investor-State arbitration. In this way, a counter network of ar-
bitrators who have other credentials than the current ones would form and 
compete network-to-network with the existent network. The proposed sys-
tem of control could create the right interplay between arbitral independ-
ence and accountability. 
ICSID should have a central role in the shaping of the system. ICSID 
could be responsible for creating a market for certified arbitrators within the 
market for investment arbitrators by, for example, improving the current 
“List” system. More concretely, the ICSID Secretariat could “accredit” the 
certifiers. “Accreditation” should be used for the licensing of training and 
certification centers by ICSID. A different approach favoring decentraliza-
tion in investor-State arbitration could also be taken. The states could be re-
sponsible for the accreditation of the certifiers. “Certification” would then 
be the actual act of certifying the arbitrator based on which the arbitrator 
 
 268 Id. 
 269 INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, https://imimediation.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).  
 270 IMI Mediation Advocacy Competency Certification, INT’L MEDIATION INST., 
https://imimediation.org/imi-mediation-advocacy-competency-certification (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
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becomes an “ICSID certified arbitrator.” 
The ICSID Secretariat would also be responsible for the development 
of the standards, first, against which the arbitrators will be evaluated, and 
second, defining the certification procedure. This is easier than it may first 
sound, since there are already ISO and other standards for the provision of 
similar services271 that could be used by ICSID. Additionally, through this 
co-/self-regulatory approach, the arbitrator community should be involved 
in the stipulation of the standards of conduct in the form of a “code of con-
duct.” Instead of having an external institution elaborating the standards, as 
proposed by the European Commission, a code of conduct could be evolved 
by the arbitration community itself within reasonable time and then adopted 
by ICSID. 
It is expected that the arbitrators might oppose the introduction of the 
proposed system.272 In mediation, one of the major concerns is that certifi-
cation will affect diversity among mediators,273 which will lead to less flex-
ibility and innovation in the market of mediators.274 Both concerns are not a 
problem in the current structure of the system of investment arbitration; the 
market as it is now structured faces the exact opposite problems with a 
largely homogeneous group of people dominating the field.275 From the 
point of view of the users, in mediation, one further concern is that it could 
increase the costs of hiring mediators.276 This is again not a problem in in-
vestment arbitration since arbitrator remunerations are already high277 and 
recourse to arbitration is obligatory under International Investment Agree-
ments. If newcomers enter the market based on the proposed system, the 
costs might even decrease in the long run. 
Certification should lead then to an overall standardization of interna-
tional investment arbitration. At the same time, it should also lead to a fur-
ther “professionalization” of international investment arbitrators, in the 
sense of creating a profession similar to doctors or lawyers.278 As observed 
above, professionalization is already a trend within the arbitration commu-
 
 271 See ISO/IEC 17024:2012, Conformity assessment – General requirements for bodies operating 
certification of persons. 
 272 Meyer, supra note 265, at 65 (for similar reactions in the field of mediation). 
 273 KHAMISI GRACE, ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CERTIFICATION: DISASTER FOR 
DIVERSITY? WHAT IMPACT, IF ANY, WOULD REQUISITE CERTIFICATION HAVE ON DIVERSITY AMONG 
MEDIATOR PRACTITIONERS? 2 (2011), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.201.264&rep=rep1&type=pdf). 
 274 Dobbins, supra note 266, at 97. 
 275 See also supra Part III.A.1. 
 276 Dobbins, supra note 266, at 98. 
 277 DIANA ROSERT, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STAKES ARE HIGH: A REVIEW OF THE 
FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 10-11 (2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/stakes-
are-high-review-financial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf. 
 278 Daly, supra note 266, at 51. 
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nity and has been since at least the 1980s. Further professionalization will 
increase arbitrators’ duty to investigate and disclose significant relation-
ships that might call into question their independence279 and might lead ar-
bitrators to step down voluntarily in cases of conflicts of interest. More 
broadly, it will reduce the dangers of moral hazard that are created by the 
closed nature of the community and the absence of mechanisms of profes-
sional discipline.280 
Market information can affect arbitrator selection and reappointment 
to arbitration tribunals and hence have an impact on their behavior.281 Pro-
fessor Rogers has made the point that it is necessary to create a system that 
will be in the position to manage and better disseminate information on ar-
bitrators. In order to achieve this, she has proposed the creation of a new 
private regulator to manage the information system.282 Certification could 
achieve the same or even better results without the need to create additional 
institutional structures. International investment arbitrators are “intermedi-
aries of law.”283 They structure information. For this reason, it is important 
to build the new information system around them and not around a bureau-
cratic institution. Certification would partially replace reputation and word-
of-mouth recommendation of arbitrators. It is thus expected that the intro-
duction of certification will boost the dissemination of information across 
the system. Additionally, arbitrators could be obliged to make information 
available online regarding their arbitration-related and other work. 
Finally, the proposed system would open the door to new arbitrators 
without closing it to the current ones. While the number of arbitrators has 
increased in the past, the market is still relatively closed,284 and there are 
only very few arbitrators from developing countries285 and women arbitra-
tors.286 If appointments were not only based on reputation, but also on a 
 
 279 See Park, supra note 5, at 654–55; see generally Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5 (on the duty 
to disclose in investor-State arbitration). 
 280 See ROGERS, supra note 26, at 341–42. 
 281 See Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 83 (1996). 
 282 ROGERS, at supra note 26, at 340–42. 
 283 DROIT ET RÉGULATIONS DES ACTIVITÉS ÉCONOMIQUES ET INSTITUTIONALISTES [LAW AND 
REGULATIONS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND INSTITUTIONS] (Christian Bessy, Thierry Delpeuch & 
Jerôme Pélisse eds., 2011); Christian Bessy, Law, Forms of Organization and the Market for Legal Ser-
vices, ECON. SOC., Nov. 2012, at 20 (commenting both on the notion of intermediaries of law), 
http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_14-2.pdf. 
 284 ROGERS, supra note 26, at 967–69 (concerning commercial arbitration). 
 285 Nathan, supra note 5, at 19 (“Unfortunately, this rule [Rule 1 ICSID Arbitration Rules] has effec-
tively put arbitrators from the developing countries out of ICSID arbitrations because arbitrators from 
developing countries are rarely known outside their own countries and state parties in ICSID arbitrations 
are all developing countries except for the anomaly in Mobil Corporation and others v New Zealand 
Government (ICSID Case No ARB/87/2).”). 
 286 See Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, no. 59, at 1 (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/lack-
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formal assurance of competence, and if information was better disseminated 
on the arbitration market, newcomers from the developing and developed 
world would have more chances to enter the market. 
Standardization, professionalization, and transparency could thus lead 
to an overall better legitimization of the investment arbitration system.287 
More legitimacy of the system would eventually lead to the withholding of 
the “backlash” against investor-State arbitration288 and eventually to attract-
ing more and more states to the system. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes understanding arbitral independence in invest-
ment arbitration as a construct of the international arbitration community in 
its interplay with further actors in the field and the historical evolution of 
international arbitration. This can serve as a tool to better explain the cur-
rent legal status quo, make proposals for systemic reforms, and make pre-
dictions for the future. 
In the different fora of investment arbitration, a common standard of 
arbitrator independence has been developed by the arbitration community 
itself. The arbitration community, in the search for legitimacy and maximi-
zation of profits, has gradually adopted a standard for commercial and in-
vestment arbitration that is similar to, and sometimes even higher than, the 
judicial independence standard. Based on the understanding that investor-
State arbitration is a unique creature of international law beyond commer-
cial arbitration and public law adjudication, a situationally adapted standard 
of arbitral independence has been developed in this Article that leads to a 
distinction of the disqualification standard of review for party-appointed 
and non-party-appointed arbitrators in ICSID. 
Moreover, the understanding of investor-State arbitration as a con-
structed field led to the proposal of introducing certification as a control 
system for the improvement of the current regime. Overall, according to the 
proposal, the system of investor-State arbitration should move towards a 
system of co-regulation, combining elements from both government regula-
tion and market self-regulation. In comparison to other proposals, it is much 
easier to implement since it focuses on the community of arbitrators and 
does not involve any major institutional reform. 
Concerning the future development of the independence standard in 
investment arbitration, it could be predicted that arbitrators will have the 
tendency to avoid taking decisions concerning their fellow arbitrators. Re-
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 287 Cf. Daly, supra note 266, at 50–54 (concerning mediators). 
 288 See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel, Asha 
Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010). 
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ferrals to other bodies will remain steady. When these bodies are adminis-
trative officials in ICSID arbitration, I would expect that they apply the let-
ter of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention 289 and the appearance of bias test 
when they are judges. At the same time, when arbitrators are ready to over-
come the community spirit and disqualify the proposal, I expect them to al-
so apply the higher standard that they have themselves societally shaped in 
the different international arbitral fora. In the long run, it may yet be that 
this exceedingly high standard of independence will be corrected in favor of 
a less demanding standard when the international arbitration community 
achieves a greater level of legitimacy within the international community. 
 
 289 E.g., Burlington Resources, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal for Dis-
qualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶¶ 65–66 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf. 
